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ABSTRACT 
The situation in which the Palestinians are living, both within Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories continues to worsen with little end in sight. The exact 
status of the Palestinians, however, has been the subject of much debate with terms such 
as `disputed territories,' `occupied territories,' and even a state of apartheid being used. 
This study seeks to examine whether the concept of  apartheid applies to Israel/Palestine. 
Two methods were used to define apartheid, a South Africa case study and its definition 
under international law. Israel's laws, policies, and practices, both in its own territory and 
the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem are compared with these definitions of 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The term apartheid is a powerful word that, for many, conjures up images of the 
oppression of the Black population in South Africa at the hands the White ruling 
minority. Phrases such as Bantustans, separate spaces, pass laws, boycott, divestment and 
sanctions also come to mind. More directly, apartheid represents the South African 
political system and the struggle against it, tying the word to the fight against a legal 
institution of racism. However, for some the word lives on beyond its historical 
conception and has taken root elsewhere in the world. One such place is in relationship to 
the way Israel has and continues to treat the Palestinians who live within Israel and 
within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). While the phrase has been gaining in 
popularity in the last few years, especially among the so-called ‘pro-Palestine’ contingent 
that opposes Israel’s actions in the West Bank and Gaza, use of the term apartheid with 
respect to Israel has a long history. In 1967, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime 
Minister, made the claim that Israel would become an  apartheid state if it did not get rid 
of its Arab population1. Uri Davis, an Israeli academic has written two books on the topic 
of apartheid and Israel, the earliest being published in 1987.2 In 2002 South African 
Archbishop and leader in the anti-apartheid movement “accused Israel of practising 
                                                
1 Shourideh C. Molavi. Stateless citizenship: the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel. Leiden: Brill, 2013.  
 
2 Uri Davis, Israel, an Apartheid State (London: Zed Books, 1987). 
 
2 
apartheid in its policies towards the Palestinians.”3 Perhaps the most famous use of the 
comparison is former United States President Jimmy Carter’s 2006 book titled Palestine: 
Peace not Apartheid4. In 2010, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made the claim 
that so long as Israel is the only political entity between the Mediterranean and the Jordan 
River, the state will either be bi-national or an apartheid state.5 
More recently, two comparisons between Israel and South Africa have been 
made. The distinguished Israeli scholar Zeev Sternhell, writing in Haaretz on April 18, 
2014, observed:  “The road to South Africa has been paved and will not be blocked until 
the Western world presents Israel with an unequivocal choice: Stop the annexation and 
dismantle most of the colonies and the settler state, or be an outcast.”6 While apartheid is 
not mentioned by name, the allusion to South Africa is easily understood. Secondly,  the 
most powerful comparison between Israel and apartheid has been made by US Secretary 
of State John Kerry. He warned that Israel could become an apartheid state if the current 
peace talks fail.7 While the academic literature and the claims of apartheid have picked up 
in the last decade, the application of apartheid to the Israel-Palestine conflict has a long 
history that predates the end of apartheid in South Africa.  
                                                
3 "Tutu condemns Israeli 'apartheid'~." BBC News, , sec. World: Africa, April 29, 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1957644.stm 
 
4 Carter, Jimmy. Palestine: peace not apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006. 
 




6 Sternhell, Zeev. "Unconditional Palestinian Surrender ." Haaretz, April 18, 2014, sec. Opinion. 
 
7 Beaumont, Peter. "Israel Risks becoming an apartheid state if peace talks fail, says John Kerry." The 
Guardian, , sec. World News, April 28, 2014. 
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While much has been written concerning the Israel-Apartheid comparison, one 
thing that is often overlooked is the bias of the authors producing it. As will be seen in 
the literature review, arguments have been made on both sides of the issue, those who 
think the term applies and those who do not. These arguments lack an air of objectivity. 
Instead of writing articles that seek to prove or disprove the claim ‘Israel is an apartheid 
state,’ it is better to examine the facts on the ground. The object here is not to prove that 
Israel is an apartheid state, but rather to question the conventional wisdom of some pro-
Palestine solidarity groups. The goal of this thesis is to move away from the politicized 
style of rhetoric that defines the ‘debate’ around this issue and instead to present the 
empirical facts on the ground and then to draw conclusions from them. The author 
recognizes that the evidence presented here may lead to multiple conclusions:  one may 
see clear evidence of apartheid policies and an apartheid state, another may see the 
application of the term apartheid as falling short or being inadequate. Consequently, this 
paper is meant to present evidence and draw conclusions from it, while leaving open the 
possibility of other interpretations.  
To accomplish this, the thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter two is a 
literature review of the scholarship on the subject of Israel and apartheid. An equal 
number of articles will be presented from both those who support the claim and those 
who oppose it, as well as a couple articles that do not fall explicitly in either category. 
Chapter three will define apartheid in two ways: first using the historical comparison with 
South Africa, and second looking at apartheid as defined by international law. These 
definitions will provide the framework necessary to analyze the situations in Israel and 
the OPT. The South Africa case study will be mostly focused on the role law has played 
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in constructing the apartheid regime, and will also allow for a basis of comparison with 
Israel. Chapter four will be an analysis of Israel and the OPT in relation to the South 
African framework. Israeli law will be the basis of the analysis.. Israeli military orders 
and reports from international bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will 
provide the context for the discussion of the West Bank and Gaza. Chapter five will focus 
being on apartheid as defined under international law. Finally, chapter six will draw 
conclusions from the evidence presented, addressing some potential critiques and 








CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The word apartheid, in its modern understanding dates back the year 1929 in 
South Africa. Here it meant that “Africans had to be uplifted ‘on their own terrain, 
separate and apart.’”8 Nearly twenty years later this ideology would become the basis for 
South African state policy. Since its inception, apartheid has been used in a variety of 
different situations outside of the South African context. The phrase ‘gender apartheid,’ 
which refers inequality between the sexes, has been used to refer to the situation of 
segregation at universities in the United Kingdom, the experience of female nurses in the 
United States, and the situation for women in places such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi 
Arabia.§ ‘Nuclear Apartheid’ has applied to United State’s desire to have nuclear 
supremacy following World War II†. Probably the most well known usage of apartheid, 
and the focus of this study, is that of the comparison with Israel and its policies in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. While apartheid continues to be used to denote 
                                                
8 Hermann Guliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2009), 454. 
 
§ For more information see Emma Pearce, “'Gender apartheid' is real in UK universities. So why aren't 
more people fighting it?” The Telegraph, December 11, 2013; Paul Burder, “Verbal abuse of female 
nurses: An American medical form of gender apartheid?” Hospital Topics 79 no. 4 (2001): 30-34; Omri 
Ceren, “Gender apartheid in Iran,” Commentary, February 28, 2011; Talya Friedman, “Cures to the 
Enigmatic Taliban Plague: Legal and Social Remedies Addressing Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan,” 
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 23 no. 1 (2001): 81-119; and Elhma 
Manea, “Women in Saudi Arabia are caught in a system of gender apartheid,” Duetsche Welle, December 
30, 2013. 
 
† Shane J. Maddock,, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to 




situations of extreme racial segregation, its usage has expanded to include other situations 
where gross and intentional inequalities exist. 
The application of the term apartheid to the situation in Israel has sparked a lot of 
controversy. People who see Israel and its control over the West Bank, Gaza, and East 
Jerusalem as illegal and unjust use apartheid to frame the situation as racist and immoral, 
and consequently assert it has no right to exist in its present form. Conversely, those who 
support Israel and it’s right to exist, argue that use of the term apartheid with reference to 
Israel is slanderous and is an attempt to delegitimize the Jewish State. While there is a 
large body of literature that has been written about the situation is Israel/Palestine, only a 
very narrow subset of that has taken up the claim of apartheid in a scholarly manner. As a 
result of this representative three articles have been selected from each side of this debate 
and their key arguments will be presented. An additional two articles have been included 
in latter part of this section that, while they both oppose the use of the term apartheid, do 
not easily fit into the established binary. Given that one of the counter-Apartheid articles 
is a direct response to an article in support of the claim, the case for the use of the term 
apartheid shall be presented first. 
 
The Claims for Apartheid in Israel and Palestine 
There are two important starting points for the claim that a system of apartheid 
exists in Israel/Palestine: namely the comparison with South African apartheid, and 
definitions of apartheid as defined in international law. John Dugard, Professor of 
International Law and former UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Territories, and 
John Reynolds, EJ Phelan Fellow in International Law at National University of Ireland, 
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in their article “Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Territory” use both 
techniques, beginning with what they consider to be the three pillars of apartheid in South 
Africa: discrimination, territorial fragmentation, and political repression.9 Under 
discrimination they cite South African laws such as the Population Registration Act of 
1950, which classified people as White, Colored, or Black based on skin color and 
descent.10 Additionally, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which 
segregated parks, restaurants, and transportation among many other things, was used to 
provide a context of the South African system of apartheid. Territorial fragmentation was 
used to describe the system of separation that the forced Blacks to live in reservation-like 
mini-states called Bantustans.11 The last pillar, political repression, covers “Draconian 
laws which gave wide powers to the security forces and largely removed the review 
powers of the courts.”12 These were used to limit freedom of speech and the press, 
political assembly, and the restriction of movement of political agitators, to name a few.13 
As for international law, Dugard and Reynolds cite many different sources 
relating not only to apartheid, but also to racial discrimination in general. Such sources 
include the 1965 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
                                                
9 John Dugard, and John Reynolds, "Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory," 












Discrimination (ICERD), which was the first document to expressly prohibit apartheid,14 
and the 1976 International Convention for the Suppression and Elimination of the Crime 
of Apartheid (Apartheid Convention).15 Additionally, sources such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and 
the Charter of the United Nations provide various definitions, and prohibitions against all 
forms of discrimination, if not apartheid by name. 
John Quigley also cites the ICERD as well as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights as his basis for the definition and prohibition of apartheid and racial 
discrimination.16 However, he notes that “While it is clear that apartheid is unlawful, 
defining it is complicated, because apartheid involves a series of policies.” In his 
statement, Quigley gets to the heart of the difficulty in defining apartheid and applying it 
to cases outside of South Africa. In its essence apartheid is a system built on policies that 
discriminate against a specific racial or ethnic group. How specific policies are 
interpreted and applied toward a specific group can make all the difference in 
determining whether the concept applies to particular state or not. 
To apply the case of apartheid, John Dugard and John Reynolds compare Israeli 
laws and policies to the provisions set forth in article 2c of the Apartheid Convention. 
One such law is the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law which was “enacted 
originally to intern Lebanese as potential ‘bargaining chips’ for the exchange of Israeli 
                                                
14 Dugard and Reynolds, 876 
 
15 Ibid., 877. 
 
16 John Quigley, "Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of Israel," Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review, 2 (1992): 222. 
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prisoners of war ... has been primarily used to detain Palestinians from the Gaza strip 
without trial.”17 According to Dugard and Reynolds, this law violates article 2(a) of the 
Apartheid Convention which covers the denial of the right to life or liberty to members of 
the oppressed group. Another policy that is in place, while unofficial, is what they have 
termed ‘road apartheid’, which describes the system of Jewish-only roads throughout the 
West Bank that link Israeli settlements to each other, and to ‘Israel proper.’18 Dugard and 
Reynolds note that this is unlike anything seen under apartheid in South Africa and is 
therefore unique to Israel’s control over the West Bank. 
In addition to laws and policies that affect Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza, John Dugard and John Reynolds also look at laws that affect every day life of 
Palestinians living within Israel. Such laws include the 1950 Law of Return, 1951 State 
Property Law, and the 1952 Nationality Law. The first law defines who is a Jew, and 
allows all such people to immigrate to Israel, whereupon they shall be granted immediate 
citizenship in accordance with the last law.19 The result is that there is a discrepancy 
between who is a ‘national’ and who is a ‘citizen’, with only Jews being nationals.20 The 
1951 State Property Law defines Israel as anywhere in which the “law of the state of 
Israel applies,” which means that anywhere in the West Bank where Israeli law applies is 
no longer Palestinian land, but rather Israeli.21 According to Dugard and Reynolds, the 
                                                
17 Dugard and Reynolds, 895. 
 
18 Ibid., 897. 
 
19 Ibid., 905. 
 
20 Ibid., 904. 
 
21 Ibid., 906. 
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State Property Law has an added effect in that the 93 percent of land in Israel that is 
public domain, “either property of the state, the Jewish National Fund or the 
Development Authority, ... cannot be leased or bought by non-Jews, even non-Jewish 
citizens of Israel.”22 The result of these laws is the creation of a tiered system of 
citizenship within Israel the preferences Jews over non-Jews by allowing people of 
Jewish heritage living outside of Israel whom immigrate to be granted immediate 
citizenship, while denying the same privilege to Palestinian refugees. At the same time, 
since the vast majority of land in Israel is public domain, the Palestinians who are citizens 
of Israel, are barred from buying or leasing houses on that land, effectively limiting 
where they can live. 
The effects that these laws have on Palestinians have also been noted by John 
Quigley, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, in his article “Apartheid Outside 
Africa: The Case of Israel.”23 He notes that from the very beginning Israel has been 
defined as ‘the state of the Jewish People.’24 For him, “A state’s self-definition as a state 
of a single racial group impliedly excludes others, and where another substantial racial 
group is present, it is impliedly excluded.”25 This is then a system of apartheid as it gives 
legislative domination of one racial group over another. For Quigley, this definition of 
Israel serves as the basis for the rest of the policies it has pursued over the years, 
including the aforementioned Law of Return and Nationality Law.  





24 Ibid., 226. 
 
25 Ibid., 228. 
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When it comes to the policies Israel has concerning land, Quigley goes more in 
depth than other authors by talking about the role of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in 
the acquisition of land. The JNF was originally created by the World Zionist 
Organization (WZO) in 1901 to “acquire land in Palestine.”26 Then in 1953 it became an 
Israeli corporation with the mission of continuing its previous activities, while 
incorporating the land it holds into the state land that is not allowed to be leased or sold to 
non-Jews.27  Quigely goes on to note that this system of land control is similar to that of 
the South African Native Land Act of 1913 which “set aside 7 percent of the territory for 
Africans and prohibited them from acquiring land in the other 93 percent.”28 The amount 
of land given to the Black majority was increased to 13 percent as a result of the 1936 
Native Trust and Land Act which also protected this land as indigenous. While there is a 
resemblance between the South African and Israeli cases concerning land distribution and 
access, Quigley does note that the 1936 law in South Africa protected the land for the 
Blacks, where as “Israeli legislation excludes the indigenous population from the settlers’ 
land but does not exclude the settlers from indigenous land.”29 It would seem that the 
South African apartheid government was content to let the Blacks have their Bantustans, 
but in Israel the drive is to take as much Palestinian land as possible. Another aspect of 
land policy that Quigley notes is a 1967 law outlawing the subleasing of state lands.30 
                                                
26 Quigley, 233. 
 
27 Ibid., 234. 
 
28 Ibid., 235. 
 
29 Ibid., 235-236. 
 
30 Ibid., 237. 
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This prevented Arab citizens of Israel from subleasing public lands from Jews. As noted 
earlier, by Quigley as well as Dugard and Reynolds, Jews are the only people who have 
access to 93 percent of the land is Israel, and the advent of the 1967 law closed a 
loophole that allowed access to other people through subleasing. 
One aspect of the Israeli law and policy that is seemingly benign is the use of 
‘veteran’ status as a means of applicability for certain services. According to John 
Quigley, a “‘veteran’ is defined in the regulations as a person who holds a military 
identification number.”31 This does not necessarily mean that the person served, instead, 
anyone who entered the military is entitled to such benefits, and even their immediate 
family can claim them as well. The ethical issue that arises is that the Ministry of Defense 
exempts most Arab Israelis from the mandatory military service, resulting in few Arabs 
claiming ‘veteran’ status.’32 Quigley notes that this subtle form of discrimination affects 
which loans are available to the general public from the Ministry of Housing, and it gives 
more favorable terms to ‘veterans.’33 Likewise, there are additional benefits for students 
with ‘veteran’ status who attend an institution of higher education, such as a grant 
covering half the tuition costs, or access to specific scholarships.34 A third example is that 
family of soldiers can receive extra child support payments for having more children 
under the 1970 Regulations on Grants for Soldiers and Their Families that are similar in 
                                                
31 Quigley, 245. 
 
32 Ibid., 246. 
 
33 Ibid,. 245-246. 
 
34 Ibid., 247. 
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amount to the support paid by the National Insurance Law.35 All of these policies are 
available to all citizens of Israel. However, since they have the restriction of connection 
to military service, Arabs, who for the most part do not participate in the military, are 
excluded from accessing these services. This, John Quigley sees as a form of 
institutionalized racism in its execution, if not its written intent. 
The last argument that supports the analogy between South Africa and Israel is 
Leila Farsakh’s, Assistant Professor at the University of Massachusetts, article 
“Independence, Cantons, or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?” which looks at 
the effect of the Oslo accords on a future Palestinian State.36 To begin, Farsakh notes that 
there are major historical differences between South Africa and Israel, the most important 
being their divergent economic development paths: South Africa created a state that 
heavily relied on cheap labor provided by the Black majority, while Israel sought to rely 
on its own citizens, using Palestinian labor only when necessary.37 As a result, the best 
way to understand the differences between the two cases is to look at territorial separation 
in both countries.38 In South Africa, the apartheid regime was predicated on the creation 
of homelands for the Black population to live in that were independent and had their own 
self-government, which allowed them to “define their own economic policies, and to 
                                                
35 Ibid., 248. 
 
36 Leila Farsakh, "Independence, Cantons, or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?," Middle East 
Journal 59, no. 2 (2005). 
 
37 Ibid., 3-4. 
 




run their civilian and functional affairs.”39 However, with regard to security matters, the 
Bantustan governments had to cooperate with the White government of South Africa, and 
as well they “did not have direct independent relations with foreign countries.”40 The 
South African government was more than willing to give independence to the Bantustans, 
and some even achieved it, but this was far from allowing Blacks to exercise their right to 
self-determination.  
The colonial regimes of South Africa and Israel differed in how they viewed the 
indigenous population living on the land they coveted. For South Africa this meant a 
large source of cheap labor. Conversely, the Zionists wanted ‘a land without people’ on 
which to establish the Jewish State.41 However, in the case of Israel, the Zionists found 
that the land they wanted was in fact populated and that the people living there preferred 
to stay. For Farsakh, how these two states dealt with the existing indigenous populations 
is the key similarity between Israel and South Africa, and that the policies Israel 
implemented after the 1967 war constituted effectively was apartheid in nature, even if it 
was unintentional.42  
The Oslo accords have been subject of much debate regarding the Israel-Palestine 
peace process and the possibility of a finding just and lasting solution to this conflict. 
Farsakh sees the results of these talks not as progressing towards a real solution, but 
rather bringing Israel closer to the apartheid regime of South Africa through the 
                                                




41 Farsakh, 5. 
 
42 Ibid., 6. 
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‘Bantustanization’ of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which she says has happened in 
three ways: authority, land, and movement.43 One of the key features of the Bantustans in 
South Africa was that they were to have an autonomous government that was in charge of 
the civilians running the territory. The signing of the Oslo accords established political 
freedom for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by allowing them to elect their 
own government, the Palestinian Authority, which would then be responsible for running 
the daily operations of the Palestinian territories. However this political freedom did not 
lead to the end of Israel’s military occupation, nor to the creation of a Palestinian State.44 
Additionally, the Palestinian Authority and police force were required to coordinate with 
Israeli governing bodies over the running of the territories on everything from water and 
land usage to security concerns. For Farsakh, “This type of security cooperation was also 
called for in South Africa’s Bantustans.”45 
The designation of the land in the West Bank and Gaza into three sections, Areas 
A, B and C, under the Oslo accords also adds weight to the Bantustan analogy. While in 
theory the Palestinian Authority was to control most of the territories, “the reality was 
that it had only territorial and civilian jurisdiction over less than 19% of the West Bank 
by July 2000 (Area A) ... and excluded from 59% of the West Bank (excluding East 
Jerusalem) and 30% of the Gaza Strip (Area C).”46 The situation has obviously changed 
since 2000 with the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, but the West Bank continues to be 
                                                




45 Farsakh, 10. 
 
46 Ibid., 11. 
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divided into these areas as stipulated in the Oslo accords. In addition, the Israeli 
settlements, which are exclusively under Israel control, Area C, divide the West Bank 
into three segments. Each of these are divided by a bypass road system that interconnect 
the settlements and Israel, what Dugard and Reynolds called ‘road apartheid.’ The effect 
is that the settlements and roads divide and concentrate the Palestinian into smaller 
regions that begin to look like the Bantustans of South Africa. 
Farsakh’s last point concerning the Oslo accords and the ‘Bantustanization’ of 
Palestine concerns the freedom of movement of the Palestinians. In October of 2000, the 
Israeli military had established more than 770 checkpoints throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza with which it can, and has, shut down movement throughout the territories. In 
addition to the checkpoints, the Oslo accords also instituted a “permits system as the 
regulatory mechanism for controlling Palestinian population movement ... and Oslo II 
clearly stated that Israel alone had the right to close its crossing points [and] prohibit or 
limit the entry of persons into its areas.”47 While the pass system in South Africa and 
permits in Israel have different origins and intentions, regulating the flow of labor and 
security reasons respectively, they have converged as a means of controlling population 
movement generally. The system of permits and checkpoints, combined with the creation 
of the Palestinian Authority and fragmentation of the West Bank, have led Farsakh to 
draw the analogy between Israel’s control of the Palestinian territories and the Bantustans 
of apartheid in South Africa. 
In summary, the case supporting the claim of apartheid against Israel is based on 
many different facets of the situation. Dugard and Reynolds compared Israeli laws and 
                                                
47 Farsakh, 12. 
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policies concerning citizenship, access to land, and administrative detention with the 
prohibitions described in article two of the Apartheid Convention to make the 
comparison. Quigley echoed much of what Dugard and Reynolds had said while going 
deeper into the issue of land access as well as exploring how the use of ‘veteran’ status 
has been used to discriminate against Palestinians. Lastly, Leila Farsakh looked at the 
effects of the Oslo accords on the creation of Palestinian civil governance, land 
delineations, and movement restrictions as compared with the Bantustans of South 
African apartheid. 
 
The Claims Against Apartheid in Israel and Palestine 
Surprising little scholarly work has been written defending Israel from the charge 
of apartheid. Much has been written on what has been called the ‘campaign to 
delegitimize Israel’ which includes the Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of 
Israel (PACBI), the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions campaign (BDS). The result is 
that most of the articles dismiss the claim of apartheid with a cursory remark, usually 
claiming that anyone who looks at the evidence will see that it is baseless, and move on 
to the next point. Few have taken the time to deconstruct or counter the apartheid charge 
in any systematic way. 
One such person, Yaffa Zilbershats, Professor of Law and Deputy President of 
Ba-Ilan University, took up this topic in the form of a response titled “Apartheid, 
International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Response to John Dugard 
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and John Reynolds.”48 The article challenges the conclusions of Dugard and Reynolds, 
saying that their argument  
is based on gross errors ... namely, the failure to differentiate between the norms 
governing occupied and sovereign territory, and the authors’ failure to address 
Israel’s policies in the context of an armed conflict characterized by the 
Palestinians’ use of terror.49  
 
Like the original authors, Zilbershats appeals to international law to make her case. 
The first error, sovereign versus occupied territory, is an important distinction 
when discussing the crime of apartheid. For Zilbershats, one extremely important part of 
the characterization of apartheid that Dugard and Reynolds ignore is that “Apartheid ... is 
characterized by the institutionalized racism of a government against the citizens and 
residents under its sovereign regime.”50 Under this definition, Israel’s treatment of the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza cannot be considered apartheid, because it does 
not claim sovereignty over those areas and those living there are therefore neither citizens 
nor residents. Instead, the situation is one of belligerent occupation, which has its own set 
of rules according to international law. Additionally the status of the ‘Occupied 
Palestinian Territories’ has been overlooked as it further determines its relationship with 
Israel, and the applicability of international law. According to Zilbershats, East Jerusalem 
was brought under Israeli law in 1967, giving residency and offering citizenship status to 
the Palestinians living there, and is thus no longer occupied.51 Following Israel’s 
                                                
48 Yaffa Zilbershats, "Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Response to 
John Dugard and John Reynolds," European Journal of International Law, 24, no. 3 (2013). 
 
49 Ibid., 916. 
 
50 Zilbershats, 916. 
 
51 Ibid., 917-918. 
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‘disengagement’ in 2005, Gaza became its own entity with its own government, making 
it too is no longer occupied, and as a result the military response to Hamas rocket and 
mortar attacks is subject to armed conflict law.52 Finally, the West Bank was conquered 
in 1967 and has been held in belligerent occupation since.53 Thus, she argues, the only 
truly occupied part of Palestine is the West Bank, which is not under Israeli sovereignty 
and therefore cannot be considered as a case of apartheid. 
In responding to Dugard and Reynolds’ examination of the Apartheid 
Convention, Zilbershats discusses the role of political rights, freedom of movement, and 
settlements according to belligerent occupation. She notes that under occupation, a 
temporary status, political rights suffer including “classical political rights such as the 
right to protest, the right to assemble, and the right to representation.”54 Israel is not 
legally obligated to guarantee political rights to the occupied, and charging Israel with 
apartheid for its failure to do so is a baseless accusation.  
As for freedom of movement, according to humanitarian law, an occupation is 
designated a closed military zone which means that anyone wishing to leave must first 
acquire permission to do so. While traditionally Palestinians have been relatively 
unrestricted in their movement, as attacks by Palestinians increased, this freedom has 
been restricted on the basis of security concerns. The claim that restricting movement 
between the territories and Israel is a violation of Palestinian rights again ignores the 
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difference between occupied land and sovereign territory: traveling from the West Bank 
to Israel is akin to entering a foreign nation.55 
Lastly, Zilbershats argues that the issue of Israeli settlements is a highly 
contentious one, with many advocates of the apartheid claim using the fact that settlers 
are governed by Israeli civil law while Palestinians are under Israeli military law to 
demonstrate discrimination. However, the real issue that is relevant, she contends, is that 
the Palestinians living under occupation are not citizens and thus civil law does not apply, 
and for the Palestinians living within Israel, the law is applied equally to all, regardless of 
race of religion. Additionally, if Israel were to extend civil law to all residents of the 
occupied territory it would be seen as de facto annexation. At the same time, the military 
regime applies administrative detention to all living in the West Bank, Israeli or 
Palestinian.56 The main problem, she argues, with considering ‘Israel an apartheid state’ 
is that the policies it implements are not on its sovereign soil, but rather occupied land.  
According to Zilbershats, the second error that Dugard and Reynolds make is that 
they ignore the context of Palestinian violence and terrorism in which Israel finds itself. 
Another important characteristic of apartheid is that it is “systematic oppression and 
domination by one racial group over another racial group or groups ... committed with the 
intention of maintaining that regime.”57 For Zilbershats, the reason behind Israel’s 
actions in the Palestinian territories is not to hold dominion over another group of people, 
but rather out of genuine security concerns. A few of the more criticized security 
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measures that Zilbershats addresses, include the use of targeted killings, the security 
fence, and administrative detention. 
Targeting killings are often brought up in the case of apartheid because they go 
beyond what the White regime in South Africa did. Yaffa Zilbershats sees these as two 
completely different cases because “South Africa never faced an armed conflict; thus it 
acted as a sovereign nation confronting an uprising. In such cases ... it has an obligation 
to use its police and not its armed forces.”58 Again, since the Israel-Palestine conflict is 
part of an occupation not just an internal dispute, targeted killing is allowed of terror 
suspects, though they should be apprehended if at all possible.59  
The security fence has also been widely criticized as a means to steal Palestinian 
land rather than purely a security measure. This again is a false claim, according to 
Zilbershats, as the Israeli Supreme Court has examined the fence and it’s route in detail, 
altering its path to preserve human rights when security was not seen as the major 
concern.60 In addition to the security fence, the road system in the West Bank never had 
race as a motivation, but again was designed to provide safe, secure passage for Israeli 
citizens of all religions. As mentioned earlier, administrative detention has only been 
applied to those who engage in acts of terror, and since Palestinians have employed 
widespread use of terror against Israel, it is unsurprising that they are more often 
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detained.61 Critics of Israel like to claim that racial profiling is the motive behind many of 
its policies in the Occupied Territory, however this claim is baseless as Israel is 
motivated by the security of its citizens. 
Along with Yaffa Zilbershats, Robbie Sabel, Professor of Law at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, challenges the charge of apartheid with respect to Israel. In his 
article, “The Campaign to Delegitimize Israel with the False Charge of Apartheid,” he 
gives a couple of different definitions of apartheid to contextualize his arguments. One 
such definition is that apartheid is “a social and political policy of racial segregation and 
discrimination enforced by white minority governments in South Africa from 1948 to 
1994.”62 Apart from specifically naming South Africa in relation to apartheid, it is 
important to note that it was a minority government in power. This is not the case in 
Israel. Within its border the Jewish population is within the majority, and in the occupied 
territories, it is a border dispute, not a matter of sovereignty.63 
Beside the definition of apartheid as minority rule, there are other aspects of 
Israeli society that for Sabel, do not match up with the South African case. One such 
difference is that unlike Blacks in South Africa, Arabs living in Israel are treated as full 
citizens, which includes the right to vote. This acceptance has led to the election of Arab 
parliamentarians as well as deputy speakers of the Knesset. Other prominent positions 
held include Supreme Court justices, cabinet ministers, heads of hospital departments, 
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university professors, diplomats and army and police officers.64 Additionally, Arabs are 
not bound by the compulsory military service like their Jewish counterparts and as a 
result they do not receive the same benefits. The application of such benefits may seem 
unequal given the proportions, but when understood in context, the provision of military 
benefits is not an example of racial discrimination within Israel, Sabel contends. 
Sabel also addresses the claim that the security fence in the West Bank is an 
‘apartheid wall.’ He notes that the reason for the fence is entirely based on security, not 
race: “Between Israel and the areas of the Palestinian Authority there is no border or 
natural obstacles, which, to date, enables the almost unhindered entry of terrorists into 
Israel.”65 Given the existential threat that Israel faces from the Palestinian population, it is 
necessary to provide some form of man-made protection where none exists naturally, and 
only three percent is actually a concrete wall thirty feet high. Other states have built 
similar barriers without the charge of apartheid being thrown around. Likewise, the 
International Court of Justice “criticized the route of the “wall” as being beyond the 1949 
“Green” Armistice line [but] was careful not to deny Israel’s right in principle to build 
such a security fence.”66 Sabel also reiterates that the Israeli-only road system through the 
West Bank is based on security, and not race, as Arab Israelis are allowed to drive on 
such roads as well.67 
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Apartheid is generally understood a form of systematic discrimination of one 
group over another, usually entrenched in law. However, Sabel notes that this cannot be 
the situation in the Palestinian territories because the 1993 Oslo accords created the 
Palestinian Authority. The result is that “the vast majority of Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza are hence subject neither to Israeli military administration nor to regular 
Israeli law. Their laws, courts, police, prisons, taxes etc., are Palestinian and Israel has no 
jurisdiction over them.”68 If Palestinians have self-governance, he claims, then they 
cannot possible be under an apartheid system imposed by the Israelis. Israel cannot be 
held responsible for the lack of rights that Palestinians experience.  
Sabel’s final point is the claim of apartheid ignores the world context of human 
rights abuses. For him “The Apartheid campaign against Israel has another revealing 
feature. It rarely deals with the massive abuse of human rights or cases of real Apartheid 
elsewhere in the world. In other words, it singles out Israel with a false accusation.”69  
Thus, the claim is not only inaccurate, but it fails to address real world issues while 
singling out Israel with unfair attacks against its sovereignty and right to exist.  
John L. Rosove, vice president of the Association of Reform Zionists of America , 
provides the final argument against the claim of apartheid by looking at the case of laws 
in South Africa in his article “The International Delegitimization Campaign against Israel 
and the Urgent Need of a Comprehensive, Two-State, End-of-Conflict peace 
                                                





Agreement.”70 While this article covers many different aspects of the delegitimization 
campaign, the author does dedicate a section to dismissing the claim saying that “Even a 
cursory comparison between the old South African apartheid regime and the democratic 
State of Israel negates the equivalence.”71 This sentiment does much to explain the lack 
of writing by supporters of Israel to counter the claim of apartheid, as it is in their eyes an 
obvious and trivial matter. Yet Rosove continues by citing Warren Goldstein’s, Chair of 
the History Department at the University of Hartford, comparison of South African and 
Israeli laws. 
The first South African laws that Goldstein mentions are the Population 
Registration Act, and Group Areas Act. The former law defined what the race of a person 
based on skin color, descent and tribal affiliation. This was used as the basis for many 
other such laws as it allowed open discrimination against certain races and ethnicities. 
The Group Areas Act determined where people where allowed to live based on 
ethnicities, as defined by the Population Registration Act, which allowed the White 
government to physically separate races by residential area. There are no laws in Israel 
that have the same effect of separating out races and deciding where they can live. 
Additionally in South Africa, the Mixed Marriages Act and Immorality Act forbade any 
sort of mixed couples, essentially keeping the white population in some sense ‘pure.’72 
The White government, which saw itself as better than the indigenous Blacks, wanted to 
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prevent any mixing of races because it would prove to be legally problematic. Again, 
there are no such laws in Israel, argues Rosove, which prohibit mixed marriages between 
Jews and non-Jews. 
Another law of apartheid in South Africa was the Separate Representation of 
Voters Act, which prevented Blacks and others from voting in the general election for the 
federal government.73 As has been stated previously, Israel is a democratic state in which 
all of its citizens, regardless of race or religion are able to vote. This includes many 
Arabs, which has lead to Arab cabinet members, parliamentarians, judges and other 
prestigious positions.74 No person could look at Israel’s democratic system and see an 
apartheid state. Likewise, Arab citizens have the freedom to travel around the country 
using public transportation, access parks, pools, and other public amenities. This makes it 
unlike South Africa in two ways. First there is nothing comparable to the Separate 
Amenities Act which separated public spaces, transportation, and other such things 
between the White population and others, in what has been termed ‘petty apartheid.’ 
Second, Israel has no pass laws that dictate when and where certain people can go and for 
how long. Such laws clearly demonstrate the degree of racial discrimination present 
within apartheid South Africa. That Israel has no similar laws only serves to strengthen 
its position as a vibrant democracy.75  
 Rosove concludes by addressing the situation in the occupied territories. He, like 
the other writers, notes that “Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank ... are not Israeli 
                                                







citizens as are those living on Israel’s side of the Green Line ... and they do not enjoy the 
same protections as those living in Israel.”76 As others have stated, there is a difference 
between the Palestinians who live in Israel and those who don’t. As Zilbershats argues, 
Israel has no claim of sovereignty over the Palestinian Territory and thus it is unfair to 
claim apartheid for the treatment of Palestinians living there. Israel cannot be expected to 
extend its civil law to noncitizens, and thus the situation outside its borders is 
problematic, but it is not apartheid. 
In summary, the case against the charge of apartheid in Israel has used a variety of 
examples to deflect and reject the charge of apartheid. Zilbershats responded to Dugard 
and Reynolds by stating that there is a difference between sovereign and occupied land, 
and that the laws that govern occupation, while restricting political rights, do not 
constitute apartheid. Sabel examined different aspects of Israeli society like universal 
suffrage and veteran benefits to show the vibrancy and diversity of Israel culture, that 
includes an Arab minority. At the same time, he uses the example of the Palestinian 
Authority to show that the Arabs living outside of Israel have their own government and 
are not subject to Israeli jurisdiction. Finally Rosove uses the example of racist laws 
under White South African governments to show that Israel has no such discriminatory 
laws to oppress its Arab citizens. 
 
Apartheid Israel: Other Perspectives 
The controversy over the situation in Israel/Palestine is usually portrayed by two 
diametrically opposed sides: Those who support Israel and those who support Palestine. 
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However, like most issues, there are variations within each side and sometimes positions 
that escape the binary system. A review of written work and perspectives would not be 
complete without including those that do not neatly fit with the other writers on the 
subject. 
The first author who has a different perspective is Bernard Regan, a postgraduate 
research student at St. Mary’s University College. In his article, “The State of Israel and 
the Apartheid Regime of South Africa in Comparative Perspective,”77 Regan follows the 
same path as John L. Rosove in that he examines many of the laws under the system of 
apartheid in South Africa, including the Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, 
Separate Representation of Votes Act and others, but broadens his purview by looking at 
other laws as well. One such law is the 1951 Bantu Building Workers Act which allowed 
Blacks to work certain trades within the construction industry, but it also limited what 
jobs they could hold as well.78 This allowed for the Whites to make use of the cheap 
Black labor that was abundant within South Africa at the time. To augment this situation 
the Bantu Education Act of 1953 “imposed a curriculum designed to prepare black 
students for employment in fields deemed appropriate for Black workers such as manual 
work or work as servants.”79 It was not sufficient to restrict the employment opportunities 
of Blacks in South Africa, but the education system was tailored for ‘suitable’ work, but 
not anything more. Regan notes that the government reinforced this paradigm with the 
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Extension of University Education Act in 1959, which ended Black attendance of White 
universities.80 
Since Regan is making a comparison between Israel and South Africa, rather than 
trying to prove or disprove the apartheid claim, he looks also for similarities to make his 
analysis. In South Africa, the right to inhabit the land and the exact location of the 
Bantustans was never a bone of contention. In the case of Israel/Palestine who has the 
right to the land is one of the central components of this conflict, and the delineation of 
citizenship is Regan’s point of comparison. In examining Israeli citizenship the author 
uses various Israeli laws, similar to Dugard and Reynolds, such as the 1950 Law of 
Return and Absentees’ Property Law. The Law of Return has different criteria to obtain 
citizenship depending on application. For Jews, as long as they are neither a security nor 
a health threat, they will be granted a visa as well as a number of other benefits including 
travel from their current country, health care, education, Hebrew lessons and other 
benefits.81 For Palestinians at the same time, to get citizenship they had to be a resident of 
Israel and registered with the Population Register by April 14, 1952, to be eligible. Thus 
Palestinians not only had to be within Israel, but also registered as such in order to be a 
citizen, while any Jew in the world can immigrate and be granted citizenship.  
In addition to the Law of Return, the Absentees’ Property Law declared any 
Palestinian outside of Israel, or not living in their ‘ordinary’ place of residence an 
‘absentee.’ Regan notes that “This law not only defined the overwhelming majority of 
Palestinians who had fled from the area covered by the state of Israel to be ineligible for 
                                                





citizenship of Israel but in addition legitimized the confiscation of their properties.”82 
This created the situation in which Palestinian refugees were prevented from becoming 
Israeli citizens and at the same time lost their land to the Israeli state. The law is framed 
in such a way that it could be interpreted to include all Palestinians within historic 
Palestine and without. Regan argues that “ 
the objective of the legislation was to take the land but not the people. The 
objective of the apartheid system was to take the land and the people but to 
confine the indigenous black citizens to a tightly constrained geographical and 
political space within the country.83  
 
The similarities and differences between Population Registration Act, and the Law of 
Return and Absentees’ Property Law are visible in the intentions of the two regimes. 
Regan also looks at the status of the Bantustans in South Africa and the prospects 
of a Palestinian State. Palestinians are required to carry Identification Documents when 
passing through any Israeli checkpoint that designates place of origin: Gaza, East 
Jerusalem, or the West Bank.84 Furthermore, the implementation of the Oslo Accords 
would create a Palestinian territory, surrounded on all sides by Israel, with no right to 
independent foreign relations, dependent upon the Israeli economy, and in which the 
residents had no collective rights, much like the Bantustans of South Africa. At the same 
time, Israel would still be responsible for external security. The result would not be an 
independent sovereign Palestinian State.85 
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The case presented in Regan’s paper shows a number of similarities and 
differences between the Israeli and South African cases. The population laws in South 
Africa were meant to restrict Black movement and education while still allowing for 
exploitation of Black labor. The Whites wanted ‘the land and the people.’ In Israel the 
laws were meant to facilitate easier Jewish immigration while excluding the Palestinian 
refugees: ‘the land without the people.’ Likewise, the prospects for a state under Oslo 
were practically nonexistent, rather a Bantustan like situation was more likely. For all of 
this Regan states that “Whilst there are similarities between the approach adopted in the 
creation of the Apartheid system in South Africa there are also differences which are 
sufficiently distinct as to render the description of the state of Israel as an Apartheid state 
inappropriate.”86 Had this statement agreed with the charge of apartheid, it would firmly 
be included with the likes of Dugard and Reynolds, Quigley, and Farsakh. However, 
since Regan clearly states the prejudicial, if not racist, natural of Israeli citizenship, and 
the likely ‘Bastustanization’ of Palestine, he cannot be included with the likes of 
Zilbershats, Rosove, and Sabel. Thus he is included in the category of other perspectives 
for his willingness to bridge both sides and present his own conclusion. 
The second, and final, author in this section is Lev Luis Grinberg, Associate 
Professor at Ben-Gurion University, whose article “Speechlessness: In Search of 
Language to Resist the Israeli ‘Thing Without a Name’” contemplates the vocabulary 
used in the Israel/Palestine debate.87 The author’s main point is that  
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Critical language needs to able to assign meaning, determine responsibility, and 
rectify injustice. However, every subversive word that exposes and condemns ... 
Israel’s actions in the Palestinian context is sterilized ... and stripped of its true 
meaning the moment it emerges.88  
 
Thus it is not the comparison between Israel and South Africa that is problematic, but 
rather use of the apartheid lacks the nuance of its historical roots and it is evoked out of 
context. The vocabulary employed disguises the realities of the Israeli project in 
Palestine, but it also fails to prescribe clear methods of resistance to that project.89 
Words such as apartheid and occupation, while widespread, Grinberg sees them 
as inadequate to fully describe the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. The 
term apartheid is problematic because, for him, it is a system “in which one particular 
group is marked, separated, and stripped of its collective rights.”90 However, Israel views 
Palestinians differently depending on their location, and their aspirations are also varied 
as a result: those living within Israel are generally citizens wanting full equality, those is 
the West Bank want an end to the military occupation, Gazans wish to control their 
borders, and the refugees want the right of return. These divisions prevent a unified 
Palestinian resistance.91 According to Grinberg, the situation is not a case of occupation 
because if it were then “the international community would be obligated to the put the 
Israeli government leadership on trial, as most of its actions are prohibited under 
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international law.”92 Likewise, were Israel occupying the Palestinian territories, then the 
Palestinian acts of resistance would have be viewed as legitimate instead of acts of 
terrorism. Furthermore, another issue with respect to the use of the term occupation is 
that it assumes the existence of a border, something Israel has yet to officially define.93 
Colonialism, colonization, and Zionism are also terms that Grinberg argues fail to 
accurately portray the reality of the Israel-Palestin Conflict. It is not colonialism because 
Israel is not trying to ‘civilize’ the Palestinian population in the hopes of making them 
good citizens. Nor is there any investment in Palestinian infrastructure or economy. 
Instead, Israel destroys such things. Also, colonization does not fit because there is 
neither population displacement, decimation, nor incorporation into the existing system. 
Likewise, Zionism is inappropriate because the current system is unlike anything the 
early Zionist leaders could have imagined, making contemporary usage of these terms out 
of context. 
Grinberg would likely find many critics among the other authors surveyed here. 
Each of the authors in favor of the use of the term apartheid would challenge the 
inapplicability of occupation to describe the situation on the ground today. Even 
Ziblershats and Rosove who are against using the term apartheid, still acknowledge that 
there is an occupation of the West Bank. Yet Grinberg is right when he says “Words have 
power. They mobilize people and create reality, emotions and identification.”94 
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Robbie Sabel states that “If Israel’s detractors can associate the Jewish movement 
for self-determination with the Apartheid South African regime, they will have done 
lasting and maybe irreparable damage.”95 Grinberg’s ultimate point is not that the 
comparison with South Africa is baseless and wrong, but rather that the term apartheid is 
not an exact match, with much of the nuance being lost when taken out of context. 
Regan and Grinberg provide two views on the claim that Israel is an apartheid 
state that do not quite fit into either category of support or refutation. Regan does a close 
analysis of the situation, seeing a parallels between Israel and South Africa, yet finds that 
the situation is not close enough to warrant the use of the term apartheid. Grinberg 
acknowledges that the Israelis are oppressing the Palestinians and have goals beyond 
‘occupation,’ yet he takes issue with the use of vocabulary rather than with the 
interpretation of the situation. These authors show that outside of the traditional binary 
debate on whether the charge of apartheid applies to Israel, there are other perspectives 
can provide some new insights into this topic. 
 
 
                                                








CHAPTER THREE: APARTHEID DEFINED 
The term apartheid when used outside of the context of South Africa must be 
clarified and defined for it to have any meaning. As stated above, the use of the term 
apartheid has been used in a number of different ways including parallels with the system 
of discrimination in South Africa from which the term comes, as well as its legal 
definition under international law. The definition used in this thesis will then follow both 
of these interpretations using a case study of apartheid in South Africa as well as its legal 
definition as stipulated in various international conventions and treaties§. 
 
South Africa Case Study 
When discussing the use of the term apartheid as it applies to different situations, 
it is natural to make the comparison with South Africa, as it is the genesis of the practice. 
Since the entire South African political and economic system was based on racial 
discrimination, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly which aspects of that system formed the 
core of apartheid. As a means of compromise between using too many indicators in 
which each one too narrowly defined to be useful and using too few to get an accurate 
representation of life under apartheid, this study will use eight categories, some of which 
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will be grouped by themes. The first category is that of the classification of individuals by 
race or ethnic group which served as the basis for the rest of the apartheid policies. The 
next categories, following the theme of participation in society, are lack of political 
rights, lack of economic rights, and the control over education. The theme of segregation 
includes separate spaces, and the creation of homelands or Bantustans. Lastly are the 
categories of control and unequal treatment by the judicial system. 
One of the most iconic aspects of apartheid in South Africa was the classification 
of the population into different racial and ethnic groups. This was accomplished through 
the passing of the Population Registration Act of 1950.96 This act classified people based 
on their appearance as either ‘White’, ‘Colored’, or ‘Native’97 though article 11 did allow 
for people who felt they were unfairly classified to appeal the decision and be 
reconsidered by a review board.98 In addition to classifying the population, the act 
includes each individual in the country’s register with different criteria for what 
information was recorded based on race. For “non-natives” the classification, citizenship, 
voting district and photo were recorded, among other things. However for natives, 
citizenship and tribal group were recorded but voting district was not as they lacked 
suffrage. Unlike the other races, in addition to a photo natives were required to provide 
their fingerprints.99 These same differences appeared on the identity cards which were 
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also issued under this act.100 This act by itself did not disadvantage different groups, but it 
did serve as the basis on which many other racially based laws were enacted and 
enforced.  
The participation by the Black population in the South African political system 
was severely limited. This was accomplished through a number of different acts, most 
notably by the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, the Separate Representation of 
Voters Act of 1951, and the South Africa Amendment Act of 1956. The Representation 
of Natives Act created a separate voting roll for natives in South Africa while also 
limiting their participation. The law created three separate electoral areas and gave each 
area the right to vote for one senator and one member of the House of Assembly.101 The 
fact that the Black population only got three representatives in two legislative bodies was 
a clear indication of the absence of democracy in South Africa which was only made 
more undemocratic by the restrictions placed on who could be elected. The 
Representation of Natives Act states that the those elected must conform to the 
regulations set forth in the South Africa Act of 1909 which stated that “He [not she 
because it is 1909] must ... be a British subject of European descent.”102 Though there 
were representative positions elected by the Black population, these offices were required 
to be filled by White men. It is doubtful that these positions truly advocated for the 
benefit of the native population, or if they did, that they had any meaningful power which 
to leverage. Thus, the Representation of Natives Act effectively removed the native 
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population from effective participation within the power structure of the South African 
political system. 
The Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 effectively finished what the 
Representation of Natives Act began. This act created two new voting rolls, one for the 
Coloreds in South Africa and one for the Europeans. The Coloreds were then allocated 
one additional senator from previous laws, and an additional member of the House of 
Assembly in each electoral area.103 Additionally, just like the 1936 act restricting the 
voting rights of Natives, the restrictions on those who could be elected to the Senate and 
House of Assembly followed the exact same criteria, which is to say that only White men 
could be elected. Additionally the South Africa Act Amendment of 1956 gave the force 
of law to the Separate Representation of Voters Act.104 The result of these acts was to 
curtail the enfranchisement of the sections of the population that were non-European in 
descent. With representation removed, it was not difficult for the White minority to 
remain in power and to create a system of racial discrimination from which they greatly 
benefited, while all others were disadvantaged. 
Another way in which Black participation in society was restricted was through 
economic rights. Laws such as the Native Labor Regulation Act of 1911, Native Building 
Workers Act of 1951, and the Native Labor Settlement of Disputes Act of 1953, all 
served to control which sectors of the economy Blacks could be employed in, and what 
rights they had as employees. The Native Labor Regulation Act stated that people 
looking to hire Blacks, particularly for work in the mines, were required to obtain a 
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license to do so.105  This license required an annual fee to hire employees, which can be 
economically prohibitive depending on the size of the business that is doing the hiring. 
The Native Building Workers Act defined where Black construction workers were 
allowed it work, and in what positions. Article 14 of this act dictated that in urban areas 
designated as either Colored or White areas, Black workers could be used to engage in 
skilled labor.106 It also stated that ‘European’ workers could only be employed in 
supervisory positions in situations where ‘native’ workers were also employed.107 
Additionally, it stipulated that ‘non-natives’ could not engage in skilled labor within the 
‘native’ areas.108 Theses laws, while probably designed to empower the local population, 
permitting only white skilled labor in white areas while prohibiting it in native areas, 
could be seen as giving the Black population an opportunity to engage in skilled labor. 
However given the income and wealth disparities between the two groups, it is much 
more likely that White skilled labor had more job opportunities given that more Whites 
were involved in the construction industry. Additionally, it was stipulated that Whites 
could only occupy supervisory positions while working with Blacks thus excluding any 
form of equality.  
While the previous two acts restricted where Blacks could work and in what 
capacity, the Native Labor Settlement of Disputes Act restricted the rights of workers. 
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Specifically, article 18 banned all strikes and employee lockouts.109 While the latter was 
seen as a measure to protect the workers from unfair labor practices, the former ban 
eliminated all semblance of protection. Removing the ability of workers to legally strike 
removed key points of leverage that they might have over their employers. By initiating 
strikes and walkouts, workers could nonviolently protest the conditions in which they 
work, should they have grievances. However, the removal of this tool necessarily forced 
the Black workers to accept their working conditions, no matter how unjust, unfavorable, 
or unsafe, under threat of punishment. Not only was engaging in a strike criminalized, but 
so too was lending any support or even expressing sympathy for a strike. The lack of 
choice of where to work and in what role limited the economic rights to the Black 
population, while the ban on strikes hindered their ability to change their situations. 
Education was also used to restrict Black participation in the dominant, White 
society. This change took two different forms: the Bantu Education Act of 1953 and the 
Extension of University Education Act of 1959. The former act gave control over 
education for the Black population to the central government and removed it from the 
control of provincial governments.110 This meant a unification and uniformity in the 
education that was received. It also meant that the government had control over what was 
taught in those schools deciding what was and was not necessary or acceptable material 
to be taught.111 Thus, the control over education served as a tool to impoverish and 
subjugate the Black population. 
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 The Extension of University Education Act furthered the divide in education 
among the various racial groups. It allowed the government to create universities solely 
for the use of ‘Bantu’ persons, and for the use of “non-white persons other than Bantu 
persons.”112 This separation, like the control over primary and secondary education, 
allowed for the quality between the ‘non-White’ and ‘White’ educational institutions to 
be different. Likewise, the control over public education impacted the number of Blacks 
who were eligible for college admission. This act also prohibited the enrollment of White 
students at the institutions for ‘non-Whites’ created by this law, while preventing non-
White students from enrolling at certain universities.113 Thus, the higher education 
system of South Africa became completely segregated and the education of non-White 
students was under the control of the central government. 
The third theme of apartheid in South Africa is that of creation of separate spaces 
for the different racial groups. This was accomplished in two major ways: the segregation 
of people and spaces within the urban areas of South Africa, including the restriction of 
movement of people, particularly the Black population, between different areas; and the 
creation of the famous homelands or Bantustans for different ethnic or tribal groups.  
One of the major aspects of apartheid was racial segregation of the population 
concerning which areas the various racial groups were to occupy, with whom they were 
allowed to interact, and their access to land. One of the most famous laws that segregated 
spaces was the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act which set aside land in the urban areas 
                                                
112 Extension of University Education Act, 1950 No. 45 articles 2, 3 South Africa. 
 
113 Ibid. articles 17, 32. 
 
42 
reserved specifically for the ‘natives.’114 It was mandated that these areas be no closer 
than three miles from an urban area and that the ‘natives’ can reside only there and 
nowhere.115 This effectively cleansed the urban areas of the Black population. This is not 
to say that the ‘natives’ could not work or shop in the urban centers, but their houses and 
communities would be physically separated from that of the White population. Under 
Article 12 the Governor-General was able to designate specific, areas which were largely 
used for mining or industrial purposes, as a ‘proclaimed’ area.116 By doing so the local 
powers had the authority monitor and regulate who was allowed to be in that area by 
requiring all men arriving to report their arrival, carry documents declaring their place of 
employment, and to have documents declaring the end of their employment. If a male did 
not secure a new job within a certain amount of time of ending the previous one, he was 
then required to leave and go elsewhere.117 These restrictions meant that only those 
members of the Black population, who were employed, and their families were allowed 
to remain in the urban areas while all of the unemployed were forced to relocate to a rural 
area. The result of the Native Urban Areas Act was complete segregation of the Black 
population to the outskirts of the urban areas while regulating their movements and 
permitting only those with employment to remain. 
The expansion of the segregation was continued with the passing of the Native 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. This act had a number of different restrictions 
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on where the Black population could live and where they could go. To begin with, the act 
prohibited the acquisition of land held by a ‘non-native’ by a ‘native’ person or group, 
either in urban areas or in rural areas.118 Thus, the amount of land that was allocated to 
the ‘native’ population by the Native Trust and Land Act was the only land that was open 
to them. There was no room for expansion of villages in urban or rural areas through the 
purchase of nearby land. Likewise, the exchange of land from ‘natives’ to ‘non-natives’ 
was also prohibited.119 Article 9 strengthened the restriction of living areas by declaring it 
a criminal offense for a ‘native’ to live outside of the areas specifically designated for 
their use, further segregating the population along racial lines. In addition, this act 
expanded the areas to which movement and employment restrictions applied beyond 
those of mining and industrial areas, keeping the requirement that those who enter must 
be employed within certain time period or leave. Those who are unable to find work and 
did not leave were forcefully returned “to his home or last place of residence.”120 This 
law engages in explicit cleansing from the ‘native’ areas of unwanted people, namely the 
unemployed, and by extension the homeless who were most likely unemployed. 
Additionally, it assumed that those who move to an urban area and were unable to find 
work have a home to return to. 
The segregation of spaces was expanded beyond the sectioning off of the ‘native’ 
population by the Group Areas Act of 1950. Like the Population Registration Act, this act 
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defined who fit into the categories of “White”, “Native”, and “Colored.”121 These 
classifications were then used to distinguish which group was allowed occupy land in 
certain areas. The law stipulated that members of one racial group were not allowed to 
inhabit or own and any land in the areas specifically set aside for a different group. Such 
‘outsiders’ were considered ‘disqualified’ people, and thus the segregation between the 
races was made more complete. Additionally, different governing institutions were 
formed under article 6 which stated “The Minister may by notice of the Gazette, establish 
for any group area (other than an area for the [White] group), a governing body to be 
constituted in accordance with regulation.”122 To truly be separate from other groups, it 
was necessary to also establish local governmental structures for the areas set aside for 
the non-White segments of the population. 
The Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961 created forms of self government within 
the areas created under the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. Article 2 allowed for 
the creation of ‘urban Bantu councils’ that would take over the governing functions of the 
areas that was previous assigned to the urban local authorities.123 This allowed for the 
locals to run their own affairs, but it was also another means to segregate the population. 
The duties of the ‘urban Bantu councils’ included the planning of land usage, allotting 
spaces for schools and churches, construction of buildings, maintenance of health and 
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sanitary services, and even the removal of unlawful inhabitants.124 The last aspect meant 
that the councils were now responsible for adhering to the rules dictating that only 
employed persons and their families could remain in the areas. 
Another well-known aspect of apartheid in South Africa is the so-called ‘petty’ 
apartheid, which separated public spaces along racial lines, created with the Reservation 
of Separate Amenities Act of 1953. This act allowed owners or those with control of 
public spaces to designate them for the use of one particular racial group, while 
criminalizing those who willfully entered areas reserved for races other than their own.125 
This did not cover just open spaces such as parks and beaches, but also extended to park 
benches, counters, seats, places and even vehicles, such as taxis. Thus, any place which 
was accessible by the public could the reserved for a specific group. While much of this 
looks similar to what happened in southern part of the United States at the same time, 
there is one key difference: there was no call for ‘separate but equal’ spaces. Instead, the 
law allowed for some services to be available to specific racial groups without a 
comparable service being offered to the others, or even any service at all.126 There did not 
necessarily have to be two or three sets of public restrooms, park benches or anything 
else. 
Along with physical separation, a major part of the apartheid system was the 
control over the movement of the Black population through the uses of passes and 
restrictions on who could be where, a la the Group Areas Act. The so called ‘pass laws’ 
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of South Africa put restrictions on who had permission to be in certain areas. Passes were 
originally created under the Native Administration Act of 1927 which allowed for the 
creation of “pass areas within which Natives may be required to carry passes.”127 It also 
allowed for certain regulations to be prescribed that dictated that movement to, from or 
even within the pass areas, of any ‘Native’ person. Even from early on the Black 
population was denied freedom of movement within the country, allowing only those 
with the requisite documentation into or out of the ‘pass areas.’ 
When South Africa began assigning people specific races and handing out 
identification cards, the apparatus of movement control was upgraded beyond the pass 
laws. The Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination Act of 1952 did not, as the name 
would suggest, do away with the passes laws that were previously in effect, at least not in 
practice. By article two all members of the Black population who were at least 16 years 
old were issued a reference book. The fingerprints of the reference book holder were 
recorded and contained within, except for those who could prove their education, by 
working either among other things by being a teacher or professor or working as doctor 
of some sort, they were required to provide a signature instead. Additionally, for those 
who were better educated, they received a different color reference book, effectively 
dividing the Black population along educational lines.128 Other things included were the 
identification card of the individual as well as employment records. The information 
contained in the reference books gave officers vast amounts of power over the Black 
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population who were required to show these books whenever requested.129 The difference 
in color of the cover for those who were educated could easily have created divisions 
within the Black population because education levels, as well as professions, could be 
inferred at a glance, allowing for preferential treatment. The reference books replaced the 
pass restrictions by allowing permits, employment histories, and other information to be 
contained within one, easily accessible place. 
The regulations concerning where ‘natives’ could live and for how long, as in the 
Group Areas Act, were further strengthened through the passing of the Preventing Illegal 
Squatting Act and the Native Laws Amendment Act. The former law, passed in 1951, 
made it illegal for any person to unlawfully enter or reside in any place.130 This included 
people who were no longer allowed to be within urban areas after they lost employment 
or were unable to secure a job. This act also allowed for the forceful eviction of any 
person who has been found to be illegally residing at a particular place. Article 6 also 
allowed for the creation of emergency camps to accommodate homeless people in South 
Africa, presumably displaced by the enactment of this law.131 Thus, the law was not 
meant only to keep undesirable ‘natives’ out of urban areas, but to also remove the 
homeless populations of these areas. The exact time limit for which ‘natives’ could be 
within an urban area was set at 72 hours by the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952.132 
This also gave the conditions for which someone could reside within of these spaces as 
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being either born or a permanent resident, or someone who has worked in the area 
continuously for at least 10 years, or the wife or unmarried daughter of the former two, or 
lastly if one gets permission.133 Permission was granted to those who were employed at 
the time of the 72 hours expiring, and extensions were given for periods of between 7 and 
14 days during which the person could look for work. The use of the pass laws that 
dictated where people could go in conjunction with laws that determined how long 
effectively controlled the movement of the ‘Native’ population within urban centers in 
South Africa. 
It was not enough under apartheid to physically separate the racial groups by 
designating who could live where, and what spaces were open to whom; there were also 
laws that prohibited romantic interactions between the various races. The Immorality Act 
of 1927, which was amended a number of times, and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
of 1949 sought to control people’s romantic partners. The original Immorality Act of 
1927 prohibited ‘illicit carnal intercourse’ between Whites and ‘Natives’ for both sexes, 
unless they could provide proof of their marriage.134 
In 1950 the Immorality Act was amended to change all instances of the word 
‘native’ to ‘non-European’ in the first three articles of the original law.135 Instead of 
sexual relations between Whites and Blacks being illegal, sex between Whites and non-
Whites, which also included the ‘Colored’ racial group, was made illegal. These two laws 
were repealed with the passing of the Immorality Act of 1957 which included the changes 
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made previous and explicitly prohibited sexual intercourse between Whites and 
‘Coloreds,’ which in this case meant ‘non-Whites’ including ‘natives.’ This law also 
included provisions banning brothels, rape, and sex with minors or the mentally ill.136 
The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 went a step further than just prohibiting 
intercourse between the White population and everyone else: it put a ban on interracial 
marriage involving a White spouse.137 Together these acts banned all forms of romance 
between the White and non-White populations, further segregating the races within South 
Africa. 
The South African government not only had the ability to decided who could live 
in a particular area, but it also had the ability to change those decisions as it saw fit. The 
Natives Resettlement Act of 1954 created the Natives Resettlement Board, which was 
tasked to see to the resettlement of ‘Natives’ from one area to another.138 Thus, if the 
government needed or wanted a specific piece of land, it had the ability to remove those 
living there and move them elsewhere by expropriating the land.139 Under article 23, any 
‘Natives’ effected by this law could within three months request with the ability to 
acquire ownership of other land, so long as the request is done in writing. Those who had 
their land expropriated did have a path of recourse and the ability to get new land, but this 
only applied to those who knew the law and were literate enough to request such an 
exchange. Given that the education system was under the control of the South African 
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government, the latter conditions may not have applied to many people who lost land 
under this law. To make matters worse, the 1956 Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act 
made it so that there was no way legal way for a ‘Native’ who has been given orders to 
vacate or who had been evicted from any area to prevent that from happening. Article 
two states that “no interdict or other legal process shall issue for the stay or suspension of 
the execution of such order or the removal or the removal of the property of such native 
in pursuance of such order.”140 As a result, the South African government had the ability 
to remove ‘Natives’ from their land, either through expropriation or resettlement, and 
once the order to do so had been given, there was no way for those effected to prevent it 
from happening. 
While racial segregation has occurred in a number of countries, South Africa is 
unique in its attempts to completely separate the White and ‘Native’ populations by 
creating homelands, also called Bantustans, for the latter, and trying to pass them off as 
sovereign nations. A number of different laws were enacted that ultimately shaped how 
the Bantustans developed. To begin with, the Native Land Act of 1913 set aside sections 
of land that were explicitly for the use of either ‘natives’ or ‘non-natives.’141 Out of the 
entirety of South Africa, only 7.3 percent of the land was made available for use by 
‘natives’ with the rest was given to the White population.142 The Native Trust and Land 
Act of 1936 expanded that amount to 13 percent, which was still deeply biased given that 
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the ‘native’ population constituted the vast majority of the population.143 These two acts 
gave a small amount of land to one population, while reserving the vast majority for use 
by the population in power. 
One of the main ideas behind apartheid was the need to separate people and to 
allow them to develop on their own. The idea being that the ‘natives’ in their own 
homelands would develop at their own pace in their own cultural spaces, while the 
Whites would do so in their own space.144 This idea can be seen in the 1959 Bantu 
Investment Corporations Act. This act created the ‘Bantu Investment Corporation’ whose 
purpose was to help provide financial assistance, expertise and other resources “to 
promote and encourage the economic development of Bantu in the Bantu areas.”145 Ideas 
such as ‘economic thrift’ and ‘capital accumulation’ were part of the corporations 
mission as a means of increasing the industrial aspects of the Bantustans in order to make 
them self-sufficient, as a means of separate development. 
The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 expanded the idea of self-government for 
‘Native’ areas from urban areas to all regions and communities in which ‘Natives’ lived. 
The act allowed for the creation of ‘tribal authorities,’ which presided over at least two 
tribes and/or communities, with a ‘regional authority’ overseeing at least two ‘tribal 
authorities’, and a ‘territorial authority’ overseeing at least two ‘regional authorities’.146 
These various authorities intended to keep the ‘natives’ separated from the rest of society 
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by reducing their dependence on the traditional governmental structure. The ‘tribal 
authorities’ were tasked with administering the affairs of the tribe as well as assisting the 
South African government with things relating to the well being of the community.147 
The regional authorities were tasked with the running of the education system, the 
maintenance of roads, bridges, and other municipal good, and the running of hospitals 
among other things.148 In effect, the control of the local government, as well as the local 
provision of public goods was handed over to the local populous. While still under the 
control of the South African government, these authorities gave the illusion that the 
‘Native’ population had self-control, and furthered the separation of the different races 
and ethnic groups. 
The idea of ‘Native’ self-sufficiency was taken even further with the Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. While previous laws such as the Population 
Registration Act generally split the population into three classifications, they also make 
reference to specific tribes or ethnicities within the ‘native’ population. The opening of 
the Promotion of Self-Government Act makes reference to this stating that “the Bantu 
peoples of Union of South Africa do not constitute a homogenous people, but form 
separate national units on the basis of language and culture.”149 Using this, the act then 
proceeded to create eight different national units combined into five groups each with 
their own commissioner-general.150 The appointee’s job was then to “furnish guidance 
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and advice in respect of all matters affecting administrative development and the social, 
educational, economic and general progress of the population.”151 One of the mainstays 
of the concept for the ‘Bantustans’ was to create self-sufficient regions that were 
homogenous by tribal group, leaving the rest of the country for the White population, 
which required various measures to help set up local governments. 
The creation of the pseudo-independent nation states based on tribal affiliation 
under apartheid would not be complete if the individuals living these areas were still 
citizens of South Africa. With the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 the South 
African government tried to assign the ‘Native’ population different citizenships 
according to the different ethnic and tribal delineations. Article 2 established citizenships 
for each territorial authority and assigned them each ‘Native’ person in South Africa.152 
Article 3 defined citizenship of a particular territorial authority area as: a) each ‘Native’ 
born in that area, either before or after this law; b) those ‘Natives’ who were currently 
living there; c) any ‘Native’ who speaks the language of that area; d) any ‘Native’ who is 
in some way related to a citizen of that area or in some way identifies with, or is 
associated with the population there on a racial or culture basis.153 In effect every Black 
person in South Africa was arbitrarily given citizenship in a ‘homeland,’ regardless if 
they had ever been there or had any desire to go.  
The last theme in this analysis of apartheid is that of control. In this case control is 
meant not as control of movement and residence as explained earlier, but rather as 
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repressive control over in terms of arrest and censorship, among other things, as well as 
treatment by the court system. Within the repressive control there were a number of 
different aspects which the South African government used to suppress opposition to its 
policies: the ability to declare organizations illegal; the prohibition of various forms of 
protest; and other acts such as censorship on imports and the important use of 
administrative detention. 
The ability to disband organizations is a very powerful tool when trying to 
neutralize opposition. Since the apartheid rule occurred during the Cold War, the fear of 
communism was used as a means to hinder opposition through the 1950 Suppression of 
Communism Act. This act explicitly stated that strikes and labor actions were not 
prohibited, though for the Black population this would change in 1953, but it did allow 
for any organization to be declared unlawful if was seen as promoting the spread of 
communism.154 When organizations were deemed unlawful it meant that it completely 
dissolved, and that no person could be a member. Additionally, no person could continue 
to do any activities that resembled those of an unlawful organization.155 The result was 
that if an organization which worked for the betterment of the Black population was 
banned under this law, then other groups which did similar work could also be banned. 
Other capacities of the government included the ability to compile a list of members of 
the group, prevention of those people from serving as legislators and even the censorship 
of some publications. The 1960 Unlawful Organizations Act was used to specifically 
target the Pan Africanist Congress and the African National Congress. Article 1 explicitly 
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banned these two organizations and included the right to ban any organizations that were 
seen as continuing their activities.156 Thus, the law was used to suppress organizations 
that opposed the South African government and its racist policies.  
In addition to banning organizations, the South African government attempted to 
hinder the finances of certain organizations as well. The Affected Organizations Act of 
1974 gave the ability for an organization to be declared ‘affected’ if it was engaging in 
politics under the influence of a foreign actor.157 The status of being ‘affected’ meant that 
organizations could not solicit or receive funds from foreign sources. In effect, 
organizations working against apartheid in South Africa could no longer be supported by 
the international community; a move that like the unlawful organizations was designed to 
hinder opposition. 
One of the most visible ways for the public to show support or discontent is 
through the use of mass movements and protests. To combat this, a number of acts were 
passed that prohibited protests, other large demonstrations, and even gatherings; among 
these were the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, the 1956 Riotous Assemblies Act, 
and the 1982 Internal Security Act. Like much of the repressive laws in South Africa, 
these different acts build upon each other with each new addition being stricter that the 
previous ones. The Criminal Law Amendment Act made it illegal to engage in any form 
of protest that was directed against any law, including calling for reform.158 Even acts 
that supported campaigns protesting laws were prohibited. In effect, this law made it 
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illegal for anyone to challenge the laws enacted by the South African parliament no 
matter how repressive or unjust they might be, including all of the laws discussed here. 
The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 increased the power of the government to 
prohibit any demonstration or protest. Article two states that whenever a magistrate 
thought a particular gathering in any public place would endanger the ‘public peace’ he 
had the right to prohibit that gathering.159 Public peace in this instance is never defined, 
allowing for any reason to be used to justify the prohibition of a gathering, be it a protest, 
demonstration or form of assembly. Subsection three of the same article dictates that any 
gathering that would engender feelings of hostility “between the European inhabitants of 
the Union on the one hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the 
other hand.” was a legitimate reason for such a prohibition. Thus any action that might 
negatively impact the feelings of, or the feelings toward, the White populous would be 
prohibited, but not the feelings of the Blacks or Coloreds.160 The same conditions of 
hostility involving the White population, but not necessarily between Black and Colored, 
were used to ban publications, as well as prevent individuals from going certain places.161 
The Riotous Assemblies Act served as a means to control Black oppositional activity by 
controlling where they could go and what information they could disseminate. The 
Internal Security Act of 1982 replaced a number of acts, with a law that was inclusive of 
many of the repressive measures that were previously enforced under apartheid. However 
it did keep the ban on gatherings under the justification of endangering public, or more 
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likely White, peace. Thus, until the fall of apartheid in the early 1990s the control of who 
could gather when, and for what reason, was controlled by various laws. 
In addition deciding the existence and classifications of various groups, as well as 
the right to gather in public places, the South African government exercised a number of 
other methods of control over the population. One such tool was the declaration of a state 
of ‘emergency’ as a means to justify excessively repressive acts. With the passing of the 
Public Safety Act of 1953 the South African government had a means by which it defend 
practices that were normally legally tenuous because a state of emergency could now be 
made retroactively up to four days.162 This meant that police actions that were 
particularly brutal or unjustifiably violent could be given legal justification and mandate 
afterward through the declaration of a state of emergency. 
While not as overtly direct in its impact as other laws, the Customs Act of 1955 
had strong implications for the nature of South African society. Article 21 listed a 
number of good that were prohibited for general importation into the country. Included in 
this were goods that were deemed to be “indecent or obscene or on any grounds 
objectionable.”163 On the surface this law may not seem to be that repressive, but it meant 
that anything the South African government did not like, including foreign publications, 
or writings espousing certain ideologies or philosophies could be kept from entering the 
country. Information or books that may have inspired the Black communities struggle 
against apartheid, or international outrage at the racial discrimination were easily 
censored from the South African population. 
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One of the most powerful tools a regime has is the ability to arrest dissidents and 
imprison them, effectively removing them from the active opposition. The Terrorism Act 
of 1967 increased the ability for the South African police to hold people suspected of 
being terrorists, or acting with or aiding terrorists. Article two provides a very broad 
definition of what constitutes terrorism by stating that any person who acts “with intent to 
endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic ... shall be guilty of the 
offense of participation in terroristic activities.”164 This interpretation allowed anything 
that could be seen as harming the status quo in South Africa, at least for the White 
population, to be an act of terrorism. Under article six, a person detained under suspicion 
of terrorism could be held until that person “has satisfactorily replied to all questions ... or 
that no useful purpose will be served by his further detention, or until his release is 
ordered in terms of subsection (4).”165 The last condition referred to release as ordered by 
the Minister of Justice. In effect this meant that such prisoners could be detained for as 
long as was deemed necessary, even years, without a trial. Such practice is known as 
‘administrative detention’166 and is used to subordinate opposition groups by imprisoning 
their leaders without possibility of release. 
Under apartheid in South Africa, inequality in the justice system was not only 
found in the form of administrative detention, but also in who tried which crimes and 
how the different races were tried and sentenced within the same courts. The Native 
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Administration Act in 1927 laid the foundations for unequal laws. The law created the 
office of the native commissioner, which was the head of a new court system within 
South Africa.167 This office was then given a number of different duties and 
responsibilities including the judicial right to hear all civil cases that occurred, so long as 
all parties were ‘Natives.’168 This passed the court system out of the hands of the official 
court system to that that of tribal law, as long as both parties were Black, but meant that 
any case that occurred between races was tried under a court using South African civil 
law.  This judicial system also applied to some criminal matters by allowing native 
chieftains to try “offenses punishable under native law and custom.”169 In effect, two 
systems of laws were created, one that applied only to the Black population, and another 
that applied to everyone else. 
Beyond the creation of two legal systems, the South African civil law system also 
discriminated on the sentencing of certain crimes based on race. According to Albie 
Sachs, more Blacks were executed in 1967 than whites by a large margin: 81 out of a 
total of 97.170 Additionally, in South Africa judges were giving the death sentence to 
Black defendants for crimes where such harsh punishments were unnecessary, increasing 
the number of crimes for which capital punishment was a possibility.171 While the 
statistics on executions is not necessarily a symptom of racism in the justice system, 
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when there is a difference in population size between racial groups the proportion of 
executions is more informative than absolute numbers. The notion that Blacks were 
getting such severe sentences for certain crimes, while Whites who committed those 
same acts were not, is, however, indicative in an unjust justice system. 
A final point that does raise questions about the equality in South Africa is that of 
the Correctional Services Act of 1959, also know as the Prisons Act. Article 44 gives a 
list of offenses or which people can be convicted included publishing “any false 
information concerning the behavior or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-
prisoner or concerning the administration of any prison ... without taking reasonable steps 
to verify such information.”172 It was up to those accused with such an offense to prove 
that they had in fact verified the information published. Given that admission of 
wrongdoing in any prison system is likely to be disastrous for any regime, there was an 
incentive for those working in the prisons to lie about conditions, make such verification 
near impossible. This protected the prisons from any negative press about the conditions 
or treatment of the prisoners.173  
Under apartheid in South Africa one’s quality of life greatly depended on that 
person’s race. Those who were labeled as Native faced a repressive regime that created 
separate spaces for each racial group and controlled movement and residence with and 
between them through pass laws. It also disenfranchised anyone who was not White of all 
political and most economic power while severely punishing those who dared to 
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challenge the racist policies in place. However, those who were classified as White or 
European experienced full political and economic freedom with no restriction in 
movement or area of residence, so long as it was within White-only areas. Additionally, 
they experienced no disadvantage with the provision of education or public services. 
Whether life under apartheid was either that of a fully functioning democracy or a police 
state depended on nothing more than the color of one’s skin. 
 
Apartheid and International Law 
In international law, the use of the term apartheid is fairly limited. There are only 
four major agreements which use the term: the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1969 (ICERD); the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973 
(Apartheid Convention); the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2002 
(Rome Statute); and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol 1). Of these, only the Apartheid Convention and the 
Rome Statue define the term apartheid in any sort of detail, though all four are useful in 
constructing and understand this term. 
The ICERD is one of the documents that does not specifically define the term 
apartheid. However, since it is an international convention on racial discrimination, it 
serves as a precursor to most of the other documents. The first article states that racial 
discrimination is defined as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” that is used to prevent any group from 
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having equal access to human, political, and civil rights.174 The article continues to note 
that discrimination between citizens and non-citizens does not constitute racial 
discrimination, neither does preferential treatment for a group or groups that aims to 
ensure equality in society.175 Article one thus defines racial discrimination as treatment 
specific to one ethnic/racial group or groups that harms equality within the society. The 
other articles in the ICERD are agreements that the signing states agree to make either 
against discrimination or to ensure equality. Article two is a clear statement that the 
signatory states condemn all practices of racial discrimination and will review 
government policies, legislation, and other official practices that engage in 
discrimination.176 The third article is interesting because it goes beyond the scope of 
racial discrimination to include a condemnation of racial segregation as well as including 
apartheid by name.177 While the historical context will certainly place the use of the term 
apartheid as referring the practices of South Africa, there is no mention of the county 
anywhere in the article, freeing it of all ties to a specific time or place. Articles five and 
six talk about the access of disadvantaged groups to rights such as security, political and 
economic rights, access to tribunals that are fair and that deal with acts of discrimination, 
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freedom of movement and others.178 The last article of the first part is an agreement by 
states  
to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, 
education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which 
lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups.179  
 
The ICERD not only proscribes the elimination of racial discrimination in practice from 
all from states who are party to the convention, but also that those states confront the 
ideologies that seek to justify such practices. 
Out of the four documents, the Apartheid Convention is one that, by virtue of its 
name and intention, deals most with this topic. The opening of the document references a 
number of different international agreements including the charter of the United Nations 
as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Also included in these references 
is the ICERD and its prohibition of racial segregation and apartheid.180 Article one 
declares the practice of apartheid to be a crime against humanity and that it and similar 
acts are a violation of international law.181 The second article defines apartheid as  
similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised 
in southern Africa, ... committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons 
and systematically oppressing them.182 
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Following this definition is a list of acts and policies that are included under the term 
including: denial of the right to life, which consists of murder, physical or mental harm 
why denies right to human dignity, and arbitrary imprisonment; deliberate imposition on 
living conditions to cause destruction of a racial group either wholly or partially; measure 
meant to prevent political, cultural, social and economic participation; division of 
population along racial lines through the use of ghettos, prohibition of mixed marriages, 
and expropriation of land; exploitation of labor; and persecution for opposing 
apartheid.183 Instead of listing specific acts, this description lists general policies that can 
be interpreted in a variety of different ways. This allows the term to be applied to areas 
other than just southern Africa, should such systems of racial discrimination and 
segregation arise. 
The Rome Statute created the International Criminal Court which was given 
jurisdiction over four areas of crime: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
the crime of aggression.184 Article seven lists a number of different acts which are 
considered crimes against humanity including extermination, enslavement, forcible 
transfer, and even apartheid. Part two of that article defines apartheid as  
inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, 
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression 
and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and 
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.185  
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This definition allows for the inclusion of many different crimes against humanity under 
the system of apartheid. The use of the word ‘similar’ creates a situation in which some 
of the other crime listed, but not all, may be classified as a part of apartheid while 
allowing other crimes to be included as well. 
The last document, Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Accords, does not give a 
definition of apartheid, but furthers its position in international law as prohibited. Article 
85, which deals with breaches of the protocol, subsection four mentions various acts that, 
when committed willfully, indicate a breach of the protocol, among which is the crime of 
apartheid.186 The article ends with the statement that any violation of the protocol and the 
Geneva Conventions will be considered a war crime.187 The Additional Protocol 1 
defines apartheid as a war crime in addition to its designation as a crime against 
humanity. 
These particular documents form the basis of international law on which the 
definition of apartheid rests. The Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute give a 
specific framework from which to build the definition. The ICERD provides the solid 
background on which these conventions are based, as it outlines what racial 
discrimination is, and names apartheid as a particularly egregious form. By labeling 
apartheid as a war crime and a crime against humanity, there is a strong legal basis on 
which the policies which create and define apartheid should be opposed, wherever it 
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occurs within the world. As a result, the use of the term apartheid is incredibly potent as 









CHAPTER FOUR: SOUTH AFRICA COMPARISON 
The South African Framework Applied to Israel 
This study of Israel will follow the same framework created for the South African 
case study above. This will allow for a useful comparison between the two highlighting 
where Israeli policy lines up, and where it falls short or varies significantly. To begin 
with, one of the staples of South African apartheid was the classification of the 
population based on adefinition of race and who was defined in each category. Israel has 
no law that is comparable with the Population Registration Act which explicitly defined 
the various racial groups. It does have the Population Registry Law which lists all of its 
citizens and information about them, including race and nationality, in a database, but 
there is no mention of specific races, religions, or nationalities. However, race is still an 
incredibly important part of way Israel defines itself. In 2013, a group of 21 Israelis, most 
of whom were Jewish, petitioned to have their nationality in the registry be listed as 
Israeli instead of Jewish, or Arab as the case may be.188 This appeal was ultimately struck 
down under the reasoning that allowing Israeli as a nationality would detract from the 
Jewish nature of the state. Similarly, phrases such as ‘Jewish and democratic state’ are 
commonly used when talking about Israel, and it is even set down in law that “The State 
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of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people.”189 While there is no 
law that purports to define who belongs to which race, there appears to be a separation 
between those who identify as being Jewish and those who don’t, with the dominant 
ruling Jewish society preferring the former. However, just as in South Africa, this 
distinction does form the basis for many of the policies put forth by Israel. 
When it comes to political rights, Israel and South Africa have very little in 
common. Article five of the Basic Law: The Knesset [the Israeli parliament] states that 
“Every Israel national of or over the age of eighteen years shall have the right to vote in 
elections to the Knesset unless a court has deprived him [sic] of that right by virtue of any 
law.”190 In its laws, Israel has confirmed that all adult citizens can vote. There are no 
other laws that restrict this right based on whether or not a citizen is an Arab, Jew, 
Christian, Muslim, or any other categorization. Thus, one of the major pillars of apartheid 
in South Africa, political disenfranchisement of the non-White population, is nowhere to 
be found.  
Political rights are not just confined to the right to vote for parliament, but also 
include the ability to run for government offices and be represented. Article 6(a) of the 
Basic Law: The Knesset states “Every Israel national who on the day of the submission 
of a candidates list containing his [sic] name is twenty-one years of age or over shall have 
the right to be elected to the Knesset.”191 Originally this was true with a few minor 
exceptions that prevented people from holding multiple positions of power. However, 
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amendment nine instituted in 1985 of this law adds more restrictions to who can run for 
the Knesset adding Article 7A which states that a candidate shall not run if his/her actions 
fall into at least one of the following categories: “(1) negation of the existence of the 
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; (2) incitement to racism; (3) support for 
armed struggle by a hostile state or a terrorist organization against the State of Israel.”192 
These added qualifications would seem to serve to protect Israel’s long-term stability. 
Yet, those candidates who are most likely to fall under these restrictions are Palestinian 
citizens who would be viewed as hostile to the State of Israel. The third distinction is 
vague and could even include financial aid to a relative living in the Occupied Territories 
who happens to be affiliated with an organization labeled as terrorist by Israel. 
Furthermore, amendment 39 forbids people from standing as candidates who have visited 
so called “enemy states” without express permission. Such states include Syria and 
Lebanon which have significant populations of Palestinian refugees. Thus, any 
Palestinian citizen of Israel who has traveled to Syria or Lebanon, without governmental 
permission, to visit relatives is disqualified from running for office.193 
Additionally, the Law of Political Parties puts restrictions on which organizations 
are allowed to run using similar restrictions such as denying the Jewish nature of Israel or 
supporting an enemy of the state.194 Beyond dictating who can and cannot run for office, 
a 2014 law has raised the minimum percentage of votes necessary for political parties to 
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have representation in the Knesset from 2 percent to 3.25 percent.195 Previously political 
parties needed to win a minimum of three seats, but the number is increased to four. 
Currently, two of the three political parties that claim to represent Arab views have four 
seats while the other party, Balad, has only three.196 With the new law, Balad would not 
be represented if it does not increase its percentage, and likewise the other two parties 
will have to make sure they maintain their presence for fear of losing their spot in the 
Knesset. (The Kadima party, a Jewish party which has only two seats and will also be 
affected.) The law will harm all political parties who receive small parts of the total 
votes, but since all of the Arab parties are disproportionately at risk, the law can be seen 
as an attempt to limit their voice and participation in the Knesset. While political rights 
are fairly free in Israel, there are restrictions that seem to inhibit who can run for office in 
Israel without explicitly preventing any identity group from doing so in its entirety. 
The economic rights of minorities within Israel are heavily tied to the land rights, 
which will be discussed later. There are a couple of other restrictions that occur that 
exemplify how different groups are given economic advantages. One example is the 
Economic Efficiency Law of 2009, which covers the amount of money families receive 
for having children, is generally applied equally across all citizens, however one section 
stipulates that children who are not vaccinated will no longer be eligible for these 
stipends. The children who tend not to get vaccinated largely come from Palestinian 
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villages in the Negev Desert who do not have ready access to healthcare.197 Thus, what 
can be explained as an economic incentive for complying with recommended 
vaccinations can be seen as disproportionately affecting a particular, non-Jewish, subset 
of the population. Another example is that of the tax code and tax deductions. According 
to Amendment 191 of the Income Tax Ordinance, donations to organizations that 
promote ‘Zionist settlement’ are given a 35 percent tax exemption.198 This law is an 
example of how Israel crafts its policies so that they could apply equally to all citizens, 
but will most likely be used by only a certain subset. In this case, it is highly unlikely that 
any Arabs will donate to such organizations that seek to increase the inflow of, most 
likely Jewish, immigrants into the area, while refusing the same opportunities to 
Palestinians displaced since 1947. Such policies show how the state gives economic 
incentives to certain groups while effectively restricting them for others. 
Education in Israel is similar to that of South Africa under apartheid. Primary and 
secondary education are under the control of the Israeli government per the State 
Education Law of 1953. Article two declares that “The object of State education is to 
base elementary education in the State on the values of Jewish Culture ... on love of the 
homeland and loyalty to the State and the Jewish People.”199 This was to be introduced 
into every education institution as the official education policy, meaning that the non-
Jewish subset of the population is taught based on values which do not necessarily reflect 
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their own, and may even be in sharp contrast to their own views. Additionally, the history 
that accompanies this state education policy is likely to conflict with the one that Arab 
school children learn at home. The preferential treatment of one culture by making it the 
basis for the official state educational policy ignores the experiences of the other groups 
within the state. 
Higher Education in Israel is accessible to most, if not all, of the citizens in Israel. 
However, there are laws that give incentives and benefits for the completion of military 
service. The benefits accorded under the Absorption of Discharged Soldiers Law include 
the first year’s tuition covered, a year of academic preparation, housing benefits, and 
others.200 However, Arab citizens of Israel are generally exempt from  mandatory military 
service. As a result, the vast majority of Arab students are not eligible for these benefits 
and instead have to find their own sources of funding for higher education.201 The effect 
is that the Jewish youth who complete their service in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) are 
given a huge educational benefit package while their Arab counterparts are left out. The 
Absorption of Discharged Soldiers Law does have any language which precludes certain 
groups from not taking advantage out it, however in conjunction with other policies it has 
the effect of disproportionately benefiting one group. Education in Israel is similar to 
South Africa in that there is top down control which espouses the narrative of the 
dominant group, but there is much more equitable access to education for all sections of 
the population, even if higher education is partially subsidized for most Jews. 
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Another major staple of apartheid in South Africa was the creation of separate 
spaces for each racial group. Israel has not gone so far as to delineate specific areas that 
are for minority use only and restrict access to or from them, but it has come close. In 
1960, Israel passed the Basic Law: Israel Lands which declared that “The ownership of 
Israel lands, being the lands in Israel of the State, the Development Authority or the 
Keren Kayemet Le-Israel [Jewish National Fund (JNF)], shall not be transferred either by 
sale or in any other manner.”202 Additionally, Israel also passed the Israel Land Authority 
Law in the same year which created Israel Land Administration, whose sole purpose was 
to administer the ‘Israel lands.’203 According to the Israel Land Authority (ILA), an 
updated version of the Administration, 93 percent of the land in Israel is public domain, 
that is “either property of the state, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) or the Development 
Authority,”204 13 percent by the JNF alone. The JNF was originally created as a financial 
organization that would be used to buy land for the creation of a Jewish State in 
Palestine.205 Today the organization is engaged in many different projects including the 
development of communities.  What is not explicitly stated, but rather implied by its 
name, is that the work done is expressly done for the benefit of the Jewish population. 
The policy of the ILA is created by the Israel Land Council, a 22-member council, 10 
seats of which are reserved for the JNF. Thus, the ILA administers 93 percent of the land 
in Israel, and its policy is decided by a council of which 45 percent of the members are 
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acting explicitly for the benefit of the Jewish people, it is easy to see how this land would 
then become unavailable to the non-Jewish minorities in Israel, which number almost 25 
percent.206 The result is that the Arab minority only has access to seven percent of the 
land, and cannot even lease land located on the other 93 percent.207 While not the same as 
the Group Areas Act, and looks more like the 1913 Natives Land Act, the effect of these 
policies is that the Arab population has access to a small portion of the land on which 
they can build homes or start businesses. With access to such a small amount of land, the 
economic rights of the Arabs are severely limited in their capacity to undertake economic 
endeavors. 
While there is nothing that explicitly creates ‘group areas’ in Israel, this is in 
effect been accomplished through other means. The Law to Amend the Cooperative 
Societies Ordinance of 2011 created committees to decide who could be allowed to join a 
specific community. Article one notes that the communities in question could be no 
larger than 400 households.208 Since these were small groups it is understandable that 
they would want to control who was able to join. The amendment to Article six states that 
reasons for rejection of an application to a community include the candidate being a 
minor, lacking economic ability to establish a home, no interest in the community as a 
center of life, not suitable for social life in the community (which would be decided by an 
expert in making such decisions), or the candidate is incompatible with the socio-cultural 
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fabric of the community.209 While the amended article 6(c)(c) does stipulate that people 
cannot be rejected based on “race, religion, gender, nationality, disability, personal status, 
age, parenthood, sexual orientation, country of origin, political-party opinion or 
affiliation”210 the conditions for rejection are reasonably vague as to allow for a reject of 
Arab applicants based on concerns about social life, or the socio-cultural fabric of the 
society. The result is that purely Jewish towns can be created with the means to deny any 
interested persons access whom do not fit their criteria. This does not exactly match the 
Group Areas Act in that there is no similar area for Arabs to live, but it rather creates 
communities that can isolate themselves from other people who they deem to be 
undesirable.  
In South Africa, the separation of people took a number of different forms: from 
physical separation to denying the right to pursue romantic relationships with members of 
different races. Israel distinguishes between people in a number of ways that have 
parallels to the South African case. One of main ways is through the immigration policies 
and citizenship policies which are governed by the 1950 Law of Return and the 1952 
Citizenship Law. Article one of the Law of Return states that “Every Jew has the right to 
come to this country as an oleh:” where an oleh is a Jew who is immigrating to Israel.211 
This law in effect states that every Jew from outside of Israel may immigrate and receive 
special status for doing so. Likewise, Article two of the Citizenship Law states that 
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“Every 'oleh under the Law of Return, 5710-1950(1), shall become an Israel national.”212 
In combination, any Jew who wishes to immigrate to Israel may do so, and be granted 
national or citizen status upon entering the country. The Citizenship Law also provides 
other ways for immigrants to obtain citizenship, namely by residence, birth, and 
naturalization. Citizenship by residence applied to non-Jewish people living and residing 
in the territory that became the state of Israel who were registered inhabitants by March 
1, 1952, who were inhabitants when the Citizenship Law came into effect, and who were 
in the territory when Israel became a state or entered legally.213 This requirement was 
problematic as many of the Arabs could not prove where they were during that time (May 
14, 1948 to March 1, 1952), even if they had never left. Citizenship by birth applies to 
anyone whose mother or father are Israeli nationals. 
Finally, naturalization applies to most everyone else as long as they meet a 
number of criteria, including length of residence and knowledge of the Hebrew language. 
These criteria were designed to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Israel while 
making it harder for non-Jews to immigrate, particularly in the years immediately 
following the creation of the state of Israel. 
Another way Israel has used its immigration policy to control who enters the 
country is The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law of 2003. Under this act the Minister 
of the Interior had the right to prohibit people from entering into Israel and from gaining 
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citizenship.214 It also allowed commanders of the IDF to deny people the right to enter 
into Israel, for the purpose of residing there, who are coming from the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.215 The main effect of this law is to prevent families from being 
joined together for whom one spouse is an Israeli citizen and the other living in the OPT. 
This of course excludes a spouse who is living in an Israeli settlement, as all residents 
therein are Israeli citizens and have free access between their residence and ‘Israel 
proper.’ 
Israeli policy concerning marriage reflects an interesting combination of the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the various Immorality Acts of South Africa. 
There is no policy that deems sex between a Jew and a non-Jew to be illegal, nor any 
romantic relationship restrictions. Neither does Israel have a specific marriage policy. 
Instead such duties are left up to the religious leaders of the different communities.216 
This allows each community to preserve its own marriage rites and practices. However 
since marriage is presided over by a religious authority, few if any marriages between 
Jews and non-Jews have taken place. As a result, people may pursue relationships as they 
see fit in accordance with their own customs, but not to the level of state recognition. 
Israel will recognize ‘mixed’ marriages performed outside of Israel, but will not allow 
those services to occur within its borders, even with converts to Judaism.217 Thus, Israel’s 
                                                




216 Embassy of the United States, "Marriage Information." 
http://israel.usembassy.gov/consular/acs/marriage.html.. 
 
217 Ibid.  
 
78 
policy of trying to keep the Jewish population ‘pure’ reflects the goals of the Prohibition 
of Mixed Marriages Act without the restrictions of the Immorality Act. 
Just as South Africa tried to differentiate within the Black population through the 
use of ethnicities and tribes, so too has Israel tried to classify the Arab population into 
different groups. A law passed in February of 2014 has recognized Christians as their 
own minority, distinguishing them from their Arab brethren who are Muslims.218 The 
move is seen as an attempt to create divisions within the Arab sector of Israeli society, 
weakening their political power and opposition to the dominant Jewish rule. 
 One of the major activities of Israel is its policy of land expropriation, which it 
has pursued since its foundation. A number of different laws have been enacted to this 
end, including the Defense Regulations (Times of Emergency) Regulation 125 from 
1945, which was enacted under the British Mandate of Palestine. This regulation gives 
the power for a military commander to create a closed military zone in any area and to 
control who may enter and exit.219 This by itself does not constitute land expropriation 
until it is used in conjunction with other laws such as the Land Acquisition (Validation of 
Acts and Compensation) Law of 1953. This law stated that any land that was  
was not in the possession of its owners; and ... that within the period between the 
[14th May, 1948] and the [1st April 1952] it was used or assigned for purposes of 
essential development, settlement or security ... and that it is still required for any 
of these purposes.220  
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will become the property of the Development Authority. Used in conjunction the first law 
allowed for certain areas to be declared as closed military zones for security purposes 
while preventing the rightful owners access to that land. Then when the latter law came 
into effect, it saw those areas as being confiscated for security purposes, and those areas 
which were still required, which was mostly likely all of them, were then handed over to 
the control of the Development Authority. This effectively kicked Palestinians off of their 
land and then expropriated it for use by the Israeli government. As noted earlier, this land 
was then deemed unable to be sold or transferred and thus that land could no longer be 
returned to its Palestinian owners. These laws fit a common theme within Israeli law in 
that no single law by itself is particularly discriminatory, but it is rather when multiple 
laws are used together that discriminatory effects appear. 
 Another law from this same time period that was used to expropriate large swaths 
of previously Palestinian land was the Absentees’ Property Law of 1950 which declared 
that any person who between November 29, 1947 and May 19, 1948 owned land in what 
became Israel, and who was a citizen of another country in the Middle East, or was 
outside of Israel during that time, or who was a Palestinian who left his or her residence 
for some place outside of Israel or within but which was fighting its creation, was 
declared to be an ‘absentee.’221 The land held by ‘absentees’ was then given over to the 
control of the Custodianship Council for Absentees’ Property, effectively expropriating 
all land from any Palestinian who at any time had left their home in that roughly six-
month period. Article 27 does set forth a provision to allow people to clear their name 
from the ‘absentee’ list if they are able to prove that the reason for their leaving was “for 
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fear that the enemies of Israel might cause him harm, or ... otherwise than by reason or 
for fear of military operations, the Custodian shall give that person, on his application, a 
written confirmation that he [sic] is not an absentee.”222 What is conspicuously missing 
from this law is that fear of military action on behalf of the forces establishing the state of 
Israel is not a valid excuse for leaving, meaning that the Palestinians who were ethnically 
cleansed from their homes were not able to get their land back. This law in conjunction 
with the 1945 Regulation 125 has also allowed Israel to expropriate large amounts of 
Palestinian land. 
 A number of other laws have allowed Israel to continue its practices of 
expropriation beyond the initial years of its existence. The 1981 Public Lands Law, 
through the 2005 amendment, allowed Israel to enact emergency orders calling for the 
evacuation of people from certain areas. This has been primarily used to evacuate the 
Bedouins in the Negev desert, who are Arabs but who are also citizens of Israel.223 
Likewise the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance allows land to be 
confiscated on the premise of ‘public purposes,’ which has been applied confiscate land 
in Israel owned by Palestinians. Amendment 10 allows the State not to use the land for 
it’s originally intended purposes while preventing it from being returned to the original 
owners if it is controlled by a third party, or if 25 years have passed since the original 
order.224 These laws allow Israel to evacuate areas and confiscate the land for ‘public 
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purposes’ even if the land is never used for the original purposes, which is a clearly 
discriminatory policy when used disproportionately against Palestinian land. 
 In addition to expropriating land, Israel has also annexed land into its territory, a 
move that has not been recognized by the international community as legitimate. Under 
the 1980 Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, East Jerusalem was annexed into Israel 
and the city ‘complete and united’ was designated as the capital of the State.225 
Additionally the Golan Heights Law of 1981 states that “The Law, jurisdiction and 
administration of the state shall apply to the Golan Heights.” effectively annexing Syrian 
territory into Israel and applying civil law over it.226 With these two laws Israel has added 
land to its territory that which is still considered under military occupation and thus 
cannot be annexed. The United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 478 of 
1980 specifically addresses the annexation of East Jerusalem. Article 3 declared the Basic 
Law on Jerusalem to be “null and void and must be rescinded forthwith.”227 Likewise, 
UNSC Resolution 497 declared Israel’s annexation to be illegal.228 While Israel has tried 
to annex territory that is internationally recognized as occupied into its borders, these 
actions have been decried by the international community. 
 Most regimes that seek to control any portion of their populations do so through 
some measures of security and control; Israel and South Africa are no different. Israel 
controls its citizens through a number of different methods: two of the main ones include 
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the control over organizations and the use of detention. Israel’s control over organizations 
comes mainly from affecting funding and funding sources. A 2011 law concerning 
foreign funding stipulates that any recipients of monetary support from Foreign States 
have to disclose it on a quarterly basis. The information required includes: the identity of 
the donor; the amount of support; the goals of the support; and the condition of the 
support.229 This allows the state to know who is funding what organizations and in what 
capacity. However, article seven states that the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish 
Agency, the Jewish National Fun, and United Israel Appeal, as well as their subsidiaries, 
are exempt from disclosing their foreign donors.230 The major organizations working for 
the Jewish population in Israel and on Jewish immigration are excluded from this 
transparency while all other organizations, including all of those working for the benefit 
of the Palestinians are not.  
The second way Israel affects funding is through the Budget Foundations Law 
(Amendment No. 40) of 2011. This amendment allows the Minister of Finance to reduce 
State funds to organizations that have spent money which has the essence of “rejecting 
the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state ... [or] incitement to 
racism, violence or terrorism ... [or] commemorating Independence Day or the day of the 
establishment of the state as a day of mourning,” among others.231 The last condition 
specifically targets the Palestinian population who associate the creation of the state of 
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Israel with the ethnic cleansing of their people from the same land, in what they call “the 
Nakba” or Catastrophe. The law makes it so that any group that commemorates this event 
will receive less state funding for their organization, which is an economic tool to silence 
criticism of Israel while promoting the state’s official  narrative.  
 The use of detention is one of Israel’s main tools to curb opposition to its policies 
and occupation of Palestine. The Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979 gives the 
Israeli state the legal right to detain people. Article 2(a) allows the Minister of Defense to 
hold people based on state security or public security reasons for a maximum of six 
months.232 The law continues, stating that if necessary there may be an extension “of the 
original detention order for a period not exceeding six months; and the extension order 
shall in all respects be treated like the original detention order.”233 It would seem that 
detention for security matters may last a total of a year, however the last clause which 
states that ‘the extension order shall in all respects be treated like the original detention 
order’, allows the extension process to be renewed indefinitely. As mentioned with South 
Africa, such treatment of prisoners of indefinite amounts of time, without trial is know as 
Administrative Detention, which is a staple of Israeli policy. The rest of the detention 
policies are based on this law. 
 A number of other laws have added additional aspects to the administrative 
detention set forth in the above law. The 2006 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law 
increased the amount of time a security suspect could be held. This includes a waiting 
period of 96 hours, as opposed to the original 48, before the suspect is brought to a judge 
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and a person could be held for a period of 20 days, instead of 15, for indictment.234 The 
justification for this was that the investigation and human life might be at stake, 
warranting extra time to ensure completeness on the part of the investigators. However, 
the reality of these justifications is unknown and it may be an excuse to exercise further 
control over detainees. Likewise a 2008 law made it so that interrogations of security 
suspects were no longer required to be audio and video recorded.235 Without such 
evidence to verify how information was gathered from security detainees, any methods, 
including torture, could be used. The measure effectively removed the oversight from the 
treatment of security suspects, the majority of whom are Palestinians.236 This lack of 
oversight was marginally corrected in 2012 with another amendment that would have 
require such recordings for suspects charged with crimes that would have 10 year 
minimum sentence, however the exemption was extended until summer of 2015.237 
Though changes have been attempted, little has been done to protect the rights of 
Palestinian security detainees. 
 The detainees’ right to legal counsel has also been hindered by Israeli legislature. 
Amendments 40 and 43 of the Israeli Prisons Ordinance limit the access to lawyers. The 
former act prohibits meetings between lawyers and security detainees if it is suspected 
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that information about terrorist organizations will be passed.238 The latter law allows the 
number of lawyers able to visit an individual prisoner or group for a three-month period, 
with possible extensions.239  These laws serve to limit the access to legal counsel, and by 
extension knowledge of the laws and judicial procedures, of those charged with security 
offenses. All of these laws are intended to reduce the oversight and protection of security 
detainees in the Israeli Prison System, most of whom are Palestinian, as a measure of 
control over the Arab minority population.  
 It is not only the Israeli system of detention and control that is discriminatory 
towards Palestinians, but also the court system. In much the same way that the education 
system promotes a single ideology, the 1980 Foundations of Law Act declares Jewish 
tradition as the basis of the Law. Article one states that “ Where the court, faced with a 
legal question requiring decision, finds no answer to it in statute law or case-law or by 
analogy, it shall decide it in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and 
peace of Israel's heritage.”240 Thus, when there is no legal precedent, the courts are 
allowed to use Jewish heritage to decide cases, which in some cases forces others to live 
by values and traditions to which they do identify or agree, instead of reason or a 
common set of values that all Israelis agree upon. 
 Another form of discrimination in the court system is the so-called ‘Amnesty’ or 
‘Pardon’ Law. This law allowed for the pardon of people who protested Israel’s 
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withdrawal from Gaza, provided that there was no prison sentence.241 The effect of this 
law is that those who had reasons to protests Israel’s withdrawal for occupied Gaza were 
able to be pardoned, whereas people who face similar sentencing for other protests are 
not given the same treatment. Palestinians who protest Israel’s policies receive 
harassment from others are not pardoned for minor offenses, but Jewish citizens who 
violated the law in the exact same manner, albeit motivated by a different political 
ideology, were let off. This is often the case, as will be seen later, with offenses that 
occur in Occupied Territories. 
 The examples above show Israel is complicit in many of the same acts of 
apartheid as South Africa, though they might exist in different forms. There is, however, 
one are in which Israel greatly differs from South Africa in the laws that it has passed: 
laws promoting the heritage of the dominant ethnicity. This is done in a number of 
different ways; some of the laws cater to Jewish tradition, while others to organizations 
and ideology. One such law is the Law and Government Ordinance from 1948 which 
declared the official state holidays. Except for Israeli Independence Day, all of the 
holidays listed are Jewish holidays, there are no days set aside for either Christian or 
Muslim holy and sacred days.242 Similarly, the 1967 Protection of Holy Places Law states 
that “The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and 
from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different 
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religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.”243 
While this law is general in its coverage of sacred sites, in practice the only sites that 
have been labeled as ‘Holy’ are specifically Jewish, while places holy to Christians, 
Muslims, or Druze have not been given that distinction.244 Additionally, the Knesset Law 
from 1994 made it so that during the opening session of the Knesset passages from 
Israel’s founding document, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 
would be read to “emphasize the exclusive connection of the state to the Jewish 
people.”245 Finally, a minor point in comparison in this context, is the 1998 law that 
required the Hebrew date be used in all official communications.246 The commonality 
between these laws is that it sets up Israel as a State of the Jewish people. The use and 
preservation of Jewish holidays and holy sites affirm that the dominant culture is that of 
the Jewish people, and anyone who does not fit is not included and an outsider. This fact 
is emphasized by the blatant reminder at the opening session of the Knesset, which 
includes Arab members who would not necessarily find this introduction respectful of 
their views and historical experience. 
 Israeli law has promoted the work of organizations whose sole purpose is to 
benefit the Jewish people. Both the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF) have both been given quasi-governmental status as organizations. 
The World Zionist Organization - Jewish Agency (Status) Law states that “The [WZO], 
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which is also the Jewish Agency, takes care as before of immigration and directs 
absorption and settlement projects in the State.”247 By this law the WZO, not the 
government, is responsible for immigration, which given the name of the organization 
means specifically the Jewish immigrants. The WZO’s mission statement declares that it 
is  
committed to promoting the Zionist idea and the Zionist enterprise as vital and 
positive elements of contemporary Jewish life … [while] encouraging the return 
to Zion, fashioning an exemplary society in the Jewish state, expanding Zionist 
education including Hebrew language instruction, settling the land, and 
combating Anti-Semitism.248  
 
From this statement it is clear that this organization has no intention to help the 
Palestinians, or any other non-Jewish citizen of Israel. Likewise, the Keren Kayemet Le-
Israel (JNF) Law incorporates the JNF into Israel giving the new creation all of the 
powers of the original body.249 Its original function was “to purchase land for a Jewish 
State in Ottoman-controlled Palestine,”250 and if its function were to continue, then this 
would most likely entail acquiring as much land as possible for the Jewish people. As 
stated earlier, the JNF has 10 out of 22 seats on the Israel Land Council giving it access 
and control to land to be used for the Jewish State. With the passing of these laws both 
the JNF and WZO because part of the government apparatus, at least partially if not 
completely, and both work direct for the benefit of the Jewish people exclusively. There 
are no organizations with a similar status in Israel working for the betterment of peoples 
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excluded by WZO and JNF policies. While not problematic in their own right, the laws 
become discriminatory with the privileged position given two these organizations and not 
to any others. 
 Just as with the state controlled education, state controlled media has a specific 
narrative that is presents to the public. The Broadcasting Authority Law of 1965 set up 
the state run media which provided  
educational, entertainment, and informational programs in the fields of policy, 
society, economy and industry, culture, science, and the arts, with the goal of ... 
strengthening the bond with Jewish heritage and values and enhancing the 
knowledge thereof, Reflecting the life of the Jews in the Diaspora communities; 
[and] advancing the goals of state education as described in the State Education 
Law, 5713-1953.251  
 
Meanwhile it would maintain “Broadcasts in the Arabic language for the needs of the 
Arabic-speaking population,” but fails to define what those needs might be.252 This law 
provides programming about culture and heritage to the Jewish population while 
simultaneously providing Arabic programming to serve that population’s needs, but not 
necessarily anything culturally specific. Thus what was supplied to one segment of the 
populous was linguistically separate with the quality and quantity of programming likely 
being biased toward the Jewish sector. In 1990, a second state media company was 
established and, like the first, its goals were to “promote Israeli Hebrew creations ... [and 
express] the Jewish heritage and its values and the values of Zionism ... [while 
maintaining] broadcasts in the Arabic language for the needs of the Arabic-speaking 
                                                





population.”253 Like the first company, this one provides programming on the Jewish 
values and culture, but says nothing about the culture of non-Jewish citizens. It is an 
interesting to note that the references to programming in Arabic matches verbatim, 
keeping the ambiguity of exactly what the needs of the Arab population are. All of these 
laws are discriminatory in that they privilege the needs of the Jewish community while 
ignoring any similar needs of the other communities. It would seem that the services 
provided concerning observation of holidays, preservation of holy sites, and culturally 
relevant media are distinct, and wholly unequal, depending on whether or not one is part 
of the dominant culture or a minority citizen. 
 
South African Framework: Occupied Palestinian Territories 
 Using the same framework for apartheid developed for South Africa, one can also 
look at the areas of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, commonly known 
as the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). While some may disagree as to whether or 
not it is an occupation, after all Israel did annex East Jerusalem albeit without 
international consent, they will be designated as OPT for the use of shorthand as well as 
the terminology is less important the conditions therein. The way the West Bank is 
currently divided is important to understanding many of Israel’s policies. The Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, also known as Oslo 
II, created three areas within the West Bank, and at the time Gaza, labeled A, B, and C. 
Area A is supposed to be under the full control of the Palestinian Authority, Area B under 
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Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control, and Area C under complete Israeli 
control.254  
 The designation of these areas has served the benefit of the Israelis in a number of 
ways. Classification was important in South Africa to distinguish between the various 
racial groups designed by the government. When it comes to the Palestinian territories 
classification plays major role. Israel issues identification cards to all of its citizens and to 
people living in the OPT with different colored card holders depending on the location: 
all Israelis get blue holders, Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza get green or orange 
ones.255 The designation of residence by color does not necessarily discriminate based on 
race, as Arab Israelis have blue holders, but Israelis living in the settlements are still 
considered Israeli citizens, and thus they have blue holders while the Palestinians living 
in the nearby villages have green or orange. The result is discrimination where Jews 
living in illegal settlements are given different cards than their Arab neighbors living in 
the OPT. 
 There are restrictions on political rights in the Palestinian territories. The 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, more commonly 
known as the Oslo Accords, and Oslo II, set parameters in which the residents of these 
areas were able to vote for their own civilian government, called the Palestinian Interim 
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Self-Government Authority (Palestinian Authority or PA).256 The effect of this is that the 
Palestinian people in the OPT, including those in East Jerusalem, were allowed to vote 
for a civilian elected government. This government would then replace the current 
military rule in Area A, and allow for civil control in Area B. As a result, for most 
Palestinians, there is an elected civil government. However, since the Israeli military still 
controls the area, there is a discrepancy between how offenses are prosecuted and 
punished. Additionally, since the Israeli military controls security, there is no Palestinian 
civilian oversight, meaning that their elected officials can in no way control the actions of 
the IDF. While the Palestinians are able to elect their own civilian government, this 
government has no authority or control over the Israeli military apparatus still in place. 
 Economic rights for Palestinians are another matter. For the most part, 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza lack most economic rights to land around 
them due to different factors, including securing building permits, access to water, access 
to natural resources and land, and the blockade of Gaza. One of the major problems that 
Palestinians face living in the OPT is the possibility that their home or building will be 
demolished by the Israeli military. Often the justification for this is that these structures 
were built illegally without the requisite permits. However, a 2012 report issued by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) notes that “in the last 20 
years, 94 per cent of permit applications were denied.”257 In addition, article 331 of the 
military security provisions states that it is illegal to build over any structure that has been 
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seized and then demolished.258 The inability to get a permit to build, as well as 
restrictions on location, necessarily impact the ability for Palestinians to have economic 
security as a home, or even a new business, may be demolished. 
 In the Middle East, water is one of the most precious resources due to its scarcity. 
One major problem is the equality of the distribution of water. A 2009 report by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) notes that “Out of a 
total annual water supply originating in the territory [the West Bank] of 800 million cubic 
metres, the Palestinian inhabitants were allowed the use of only 110 million cubic metres, 
despite rapid population growth.”259 This means that the Palestinians only get 13.75 
percent of the water located within their own land. Likewise a 2011 report from Oxfam 
notes that one particular settlement of 9,400 people was using 45 million cubic meters 
(mcm) which “constitutes almost a third of the quantity of water allocated to the 2.5 
million Palestinians living in the West Bank.”260 This means that the settlers get to use 
4,787 mcm of water per person, while the Palestinians only get 54 mcm per person. From 
these numbers it is obvious that the water available is not the issue, but rather the grossly 
unequal distribution of this resource. Water, which is necessary for eating, bathing, 
cleaning, and caring for crops, has a huge impact on the quality of life. The OHCHR 
report notes that 30 wells in Palestinian villages have been taken over by settlers, 
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reducing the communities’ access to water.261 The report also states that since 2010, 
Israeli authorities have been responsible for the “Destruction of water infrastructure, 
including rainwater cisterns.”262 These two facts, combined with the difficulties to obtain 
a building permit, means that Palestinians are losing access to water through illegal 
expropriation and destruction of wells while not being allowed to build new infrastructure 
to combat these acts.  
 Another way in which the economic rights of Palestinians is impaired, is the 
ability to access natural resources of the land. The construction of the Security 
Fence/Separation Barrier (which will be referred to as the Barrier from here on) has huge 
implications. The path of the Barrier is such that is cuts off villagers from their land, be it 
fields or tree groves.263 The erection of a physical barrier between villagers and their land 
prevents them from working on their land and reaping its agricultural benefits. This 
impoverishes Palestinians and denies them access to a livelihood.  
Additionally, a 2011 report from the Palestinian Ministry of National Economy 
notes that the Israeli government prevents Palestinians from exploiting many of the 
natural resources in the area.264 One example is the extraction of minerals from the Dead 
Sea. The area of the West Bank which borders the Dead Sea is labeled as ‘Area C,’ which 
is under Israeli control, and has been declared a closed military zone preventing the 
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Palestinians from accessing it.265 Even if the Palestinians had access to the Dead Sea, the 
inability to get building permits would further impair the ability to make use of this 
resource. Likewise, most of the quarries in the West Bank are located within ‘Area C’ the 
rights to which are given over to Israeli companies, preventing Palestinians from 
exploiting these resources as well.266 The result of these policies is that the Palestinians 
are systematically separated from their land and the natural resources found there, be it 
agricultural or mineral, denying them economic rights. 
 Just as there is control over the economic activities in the West Bank, the situation 
in Gaza has many similar features. While the Israeli military does not control Gaza on the 
ground, its control of the borders has major negative effects on the people. Israel, with 
cooperation of Egypt, prevents most exports from leaving the area, preventing any sort of 
economic trade from occurring with the area.267 Additionally the blockade of Gaza limits 
the access of fishermen to within 3 nautical miles of the coast, preventing them accessing 
70 percent of their recognized rights under international law.268 The lack of trade 
opportunities and access to the sea has led to the continued impoverishment of the 
Palestinians in Gaza to the point where Human Rights Watch reports that more than 70 
percent are receiving humanitarian assistance.269 These policies as well as those in the 
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West Bank show how Israel has complete control over the economic activities of the 
Palestinian people. 
 The separation of people and spaces was a major part of the apartheid system in 
South Africa. This was accomplished through creating spaces for individual races, and 
controlling the movement of people. As stated above, the West Bank is separated into 
three areas, each with varying levels of Palestinian and Israeli control. In the OPT, a 
similar separation of spaces is accomplished through two means: the building of 
settlements, and the construction of the Barrier. According to the OHCHR, 60 percent of 
the West Bank is denoted as Area C.270 Settlements are communities that are built in the 
West Bank on expropriated land for use by the Israeli population. This act is illegal under 
article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which states that “The Occupying 
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies.”271 However, this has not deterred Israel from doing so. In the West Bank only 
three percent of the land is taken up by settlements, but with buffer areas, and area 
allocated for expansion, 43 percent is designated to their use.272 The settlements are only 
for use by the Israeli population, and not the Palestinian population of the OPT. This 
effectively creates separate spaces, one for the Israelis, one for everyone else, and, given 
that 60 percent is Area C, this leaves 40 percent for the Palestinians. According to the 
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OHCHR report, there are roughly 320,000273 settlers living in the West Bank with a 
Palestinian population of roughly 2.5 million,274 effectively giving slightly over 10 
percent of the population, the majority of the land for their use. 
 The Barrier serves a similar purpose to the settlements. Julie Peteet notes that the 
Hebrew word for separation is ‘hafrada’ and is often used in conjunction with the Barrier. 
By designating the Barrier as the separation Barrier, its purpose becomes quite clear. If 
its construction had been purely for security reasons, then one would expect that its path 
would follow the 1949 armistice line or “Green” line. Instead, 85 percent of the Barrier 
lies within this area, partitioning the Palestinian population.275 Human Rights Watch 
notes that those caught between the Barrier and the ‘Green’ Line are not allowed to enter 
into Israel, and therefore must cross the Barrier to access services located in the West 
Bank.276 As noted above, the Barrier also is used to cut of Palestinians from their land, 
and with the use of things like military order 125 used to declare land closed military 
zones, which is then declared ‘abandoned.’ The erection of the Barrier and the 
settlements can be seen as being used to push Palestinians into smaller spaces while 
increasing the area allotted to the Israeli population.  
 The movement of the Palestinian population is severely curtailed by the Israeli 
military through a series of checkpoints and physical obstructions, while roads are built to 
facilitate movement between the settlements and Israel. According to B’Tselem, the 
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Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, as of February 
2014 there were 99 fixed checkpoints located within the West Bank, 59 of which were 
internal and the remaining located on the border.277 The fact that 60 percent of the fixed 
checkpoints were located within the West Bank indicates that the control of movement is 
not restricted to crossing from the OPT into Israel, but is also restricted from village to 
village within the territories. Additionally, in December there were 256 so-called ‘flying’ 
checkpoints, which were set up at the whim of the Israel military.278 Unlike the fixed 
checkpoints these are setup without warning, which can severely impact the movement of 
Palestinians who are not expecting to have delays or blockages only to find a new 
checkpoint exists. The ID cards play a major role in controlling movement by deciding 
who is allowed to pass where. Those with the blue Israeli cards have the freedom to go 
wherever they please, while the Palestinians living in the OPT are restricted to their own 
area, unless they have permits stating otherwise. This includes restricting access to places 
of worship, such as mosques and churches, through the use of closures of checkpoints 
and delays.279 The use of checkpoints is not just a means to weed out those who wish to 
do harm, but it also affects people who are trying to attend a religious service or any other 
activity which requires one to travel, even just within the West Bank and not into Israel. 
 While the Palestinian population of the OPT is subject to delays and closures, the 
Israeli population in the settlements gets ease of travel through the use of bypass roads. 
                                                





279 HRC, 13. 
 
99 
These roads are accessible only to Israelis and cut through the West Bank, connecting 
settlements with Israel. According to B’Tselem there are 65.12 km of bypass roads in the 
West Bank, some of which Palestinians are not allow to cross with vehicles, forcing them 
to find alternate forms of transport once on the other side.280 These roads also hinder 
Palestinian movement by limiting which roads Palestinians can use or even cross, forcing 
them to find new transportation or alternate routes that may take longer to reach their 
destination. The result is that Jews, and Israelis in general, have more mobility rights in 
their ability to travel throughout Israel and the OPT, than the Palestinian populations 
living in the OPT, who are subject to checkpoints and delays in traveling between 
villages. Such movement restrictions also have economic effects as delays prevent good 
from arriving at market in a timely manner, but also health effects as delays affect the 
ability of ambulances to travel quickly in times of emergency.281 
 A major part of the apartheid system in South Africa was the creation of ethnic 
homelands, or Bantustans, for the Black population. The idea was that the Black 
population would have its own pseudo-nation states, with their own semiautonomous 
governments. The idea the Israel would seek to recreate these states is not a foreign idea. 
Writing over a decade ago, Avi Primor made this exact argument with respect to, then 
Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon’s policy towards the OPT.282 Primor notes the “enclaves 
were surrounded by South African territory and run by collaborators totally subservient to 
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the authority of the larger ‘neighbor,’ South Africa.”283 If one replaces South Africa with 
Israel, then looks at a map of the Palestinian population vis-a-vis the settlements in the 
OPT, it seems clear that is exactly what is happening (see appendix A). The OHCHR 
reports that Israel’s settlements create enclaves in the West Bank, fragmenting the 
territory. Additionally, it notes that route of the Barrier “threatens to divide the West 
Bank into two separate areas and cut off East Jerusalem from the rest of the West 
Bank’”284 If this were to happen, the lack of any continuous Palestinian territory would 
make the creation of a Palestinian State nearly impossible. 
 A major part of the Bantustans was that each one had its own civilian government 
distinct from that of the White areas next door, while still being controlled by the South 
African military. As stated above, Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank are home 
to Israeli citizens who live under Israeli civil law. Likewise the Palestinians in the OPT 
live under the rule of the Palestinian Authority if they are within Areas A or B. The 
settlements in Area C are under Israeli control, A is Palestinian control, and B is 
Palestinian civil and Israeli military control. The result is two sets of laws for two 
different people: if you are Israeli, you get Israeli civil law, if you are not, you get Israeli 
military and Palestinian civil law.285 Subsection six of article one of Oslo II states that the 
Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee will be the liaison between 
the Palestinian Authority and Israel, meaning that the PA is not an autonomous entity but 
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is still required to coordinate with Israel.286 Thus, the picture seems to be that the 
Palestinian areas of the West Bank are shrinking with the expansion of the surrounding 
Israeli settlements, while the Palestinians themselves live under a civilian government 
which must continue to report to and coordinate with the Israeli government. The effect 
of this seems to be the creation of a Bantustan-like situation for the Palestinians. Nor does 
Israel have any interest in annexing the entirety of the OPT and absorbing its population 
into its own as citizens, for it if did, it would compromise Jewish character of the Israel 
state. Rather, Israel’s goal is to keep the land, without the Palestinian population residing 
on it and thus forcing them into small semi-autonomous enclaves without having any 
responsibility for their welfare.  
 Control by the security forces was a major part of South Africa’s apartheid 
regime, and the same continues to be true in the Occupied Palestinian Territories at the 
hands of the Israeli military. The military courts are the main source of judicial process 
for the Palestinians. Military order 10 from the Order Regarding Security Provisions of 
2009 states that “A military court is authorized to adjudicate any offense defined in 
security legislation and law.”287 The effect is that whenever a security offense is 
committed, which most offenses count as, the Israeli military has the authority to try 
those charges in its own courts. Additionally Order six under the Proclamation Regarding 
Implementation of the Interim Agreement (Proclamation No. 7) gives the military power 
over the settlements, Area C, “any matter relating to the external security of the region, 
the security and public order of the settlements, military sites and Israelis, [and] security 
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and public order in areas under the responsibility of Israeli security.”288 This 
proclamation is vague enough to allow it to be applied wherever in the OPT. Protests 
against settlements and the Barrier, which is likely defined as a military site, fall within 
this order allowing the Israeli military to arrest people even in Area A for supposed 
offenses. To ensure that there is no confusion or possible legal recourse, article eight of 
Order 130 of Orders Regarding Interpretation declares that “Security legislation takes 
precedence over any law, even if it does not explicitly cancel it.”289 This makes sure that 
security legislation overrides civilian law in cases where a discrepancy exists, forestalling 
any claims that the charges were brought to the wrong court. 
 Like South Africa, Israel has used administrative detention to hold security 
suspects for indefinite amounts of time. Military order 273 concerning security provisions 
is nearly verbatim from the 1979 Emergency Powers Law which allows the detention of 
security suspects for six months with a possible six month extension, in which the 
extension is treated like the original so as to allow for an indefinite number of 
extensions.290 According to the 2014 World Report from Human Rights Watch “As of 
September 30 [2013], Israel held 135 Palestinian administrative detainees without charge 
or trial, based on secret evidence.”291 This allows Israel to keep particularly active 
                                                
288 Proclamation Regarding Implementation of the Interim Agreement (Proclamation No. 7), 1995 article 6 
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/military-orders/mil04?lang=en. 
 
289 Orders Regarding Interpretation – Order 130, 1967 Article 8 [Order 130] 
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/military-orders/mil05?lang=en 
 
290 Military Order 2009, article 273. 
 
291 HRW 2014, 2. 
 
103 
Palestinians from organizing against Israel and the encroachment onto Palestinian land by 
holding them for indefinite periods and without disclosing the exact reasons why. 
 A vast number of offenses are listed under Israeli military order for which one can 
be arrested. Some of these offenses carry with them punishments that seem completely 
disproportionate when compared with others. One in particular is the punishment for 
throwing things. By order 212 of the security provisions  
A person who throws and object, including a stone-  (1) In a manner that harms or 
may harm traffic in a transportation lane shall be sentence to ten years 
imprisonment; (2) At a person or property, with the intent to harm the person or 
property shall be sentenced to ten years imprisonment; (3) At a moving vehicle, 
with the intent to harm it or the person traveling in it shall be sentenced to twenty 
years imprisonment.292  
 
Thus, the throwing of a stone, a  common occurrence in the OPT, carries a sentencing of 
at least ten years based purely on intent regardless of whether the stone hit its intended 
target. Also, intent seems to be implied by this law, as it is unlikely that a person would 
throw a stone at something, without intent to hit it. To put this law in context, kidnapping 
carries a sentence of ten to twenty years imprisonment, unlawful imprisonment carries 
only three to five, and assaulting a soldier gets 10 years, threatening a soldier gets seven, 
and insulting a soldier gets one.293 Thus throwing a stone at something or someone 
carries a stronger punishment than insulting a soldier or falsely imprisoning someone. 
 The ability of the military to control life is manifested in a number of different 
ways as well. The chapter governing ‘Administrative Powers’ of the security provisions 
orders give the Israeli military the power to impose curfews, declare military zones, 
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require the removal or covering of flags or symbols, require information concerning 
identification, and other security measures as a military commander deems necessary.294 
Another power included is the ability to force shops and public services such as schools 
and hospitals to open or close at certain times as the military sees important. These are all 
ways in which the military controls every aspect of the lives of Palestinians. Additionally, 
article three of Order 101 Prohibition of Acts of Incitement prohibits any “procession, 
gathering or rally may be held without a permit issued by a military commander” where 
these congregations of people have a political nature.295 This makes any form of protest 
against the Barrier, settlements, or any other policy illegal without a permit, and if these 
permits are anything like those for buildings, the chance of obtaining one is incredibly 
low. 
 When it comes to security control, the court system is also important, especially 
how it treats settlers and Palestinians who commit similar crimes. An important law to 
note first is the 2012 amendment to the Civil Wrongs Law. This law creates obstacles for 
Palestinians living in the OPT to obtain redress for violence carried out by the Israeli 
military, effectively shielding the state from lawsuits brought against it for violations 
law.296 This gives the IDF license to act with impunity in the OPT no matter the 
circumstances and justifications for the use of violence. 
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 When it comes to punishing crimes in the West Bank, who is punished and to 
what extent depends entirely on nationality. In the OPT, Israelis who commit crimes are 
subject to Israeli civil law and will receive lesser sentences than the Palestinians who are 
subject to Israeli military law. The Council for European Palestinian Relations (CEPR) 
notes that when settlers carry out violent attacks against Palestinians, these attacks are 
often done with the military present, and with little or no legal recourse for their 
actions.297 The OHCHR reports similar findings with “over 91 per cent of all concluded 
investigations into complaints of criminal offences against Palestinian persons and 
property in the OPT are closed without an indictment being served, mostly due to 
investigative failures” even when most of these attacks occur in broad daylight, and in the 
presence of Israeli security forces.298 Conversely, “Between 90 to 95 per cent of cases 
against Palestinians are investigated and go to court.”299 If a settler attacks a Palestinian 
during the day, with witnesses, little if anything is likely to be done; an attack by a 
Palestinian will most likely result in an arrest and be brought to court. Even if the settler 
is brought to court, the systems of law are such that the punishments given will be wildly 
unequal.300 
 The comparison between Israel and South Africa is not an uncommon one, and 
indeed there are some similarities. Using a framework that includes eight criteria, 
                                                











classification, political and economic rights, education, separate spaces, Bantustans, 
control, and the judicial system, the relationship of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories to apartheid has been analyzed. Though there is much in common, Israel 
stands out from South Africa in the way it creates its laws. Instead of legislating 
restrictions on the minority citizen population, Israel passes laws that promote the well-
being of its Jewish citizens. While some laws do this explicitly, such as those concerning 
broadcasting or education, others do so in the implementation, such as giving extra 
benefits to those who serve in the Israeli military. However, South Africa is not the only 
place where apartheid is defined. Due to its grievousness, the prohibition of apartheid has 








CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPARISON 
Apartheid in International Law: Israel 
 In international law there are two major documents that define apartheid: The 
Rome Statute of 2002 and the Apartheid Convention adopted in 1973. The criteria set 
forth in these treaties have many things in common, though worded or categorized 
differently. Therefore, the guidelines for assessing Israel with respect to international law 
on apartheid will be based on the Apartheid Convention, as this topic is the focus of the 
document, with a couple criteria from the Rome Statute that seemed to be missing added 
in. Additionally, as this section is the second comparison with apartheid, the policies 
discussed within will be covered more briefly and reference their descriptions above. 
 The second article of the Apartheid convention lays out six categories of acts that, 
if committed in combination, constitute apartheid. The first is the denial “of the right to 
life and the liberty of person” which includes murder and killing, bodily or mental harm, 
or the infringement on human dignity, and arbitrary arrest and punishment.301 Within 
Israel there is no intentional, or at least large-scale systematic murder of Palestinian and 
other minority citizens of Israel. As stated above, there are cases of discrimination against 
them, but they are left to live out their lives as minorities.  
The section on human dignity in the Apartheid Convention also includes cruel and 
unusual punishment, including torture. As discussed in chapter four, laws have been put 
                                                




in place removing oversight of interrogation of security detainees who could be subjected 
to torture. According to Amnesty International, Palestinian prisoners have been subjected 
to various forms of torture including stress positions, sleep deprivation, verbal and 
physical abuse among other things.302 In addition to torture, the Rome Statute includes 
the category of ‘enforced sterilization’ which fits into the section of human dignity.303 
Accordingly, there have been allegations that Israel had a policy mandating that 
Ethiopian women immigrants, most of whom are Jewish, be given birth control 
injections.304 If Israel is the homeland of the entire Jewish population worldwide, it is 
curious that Jewish immigrants would be forcibly sterilized upon entering the country. 
This policy seems counterintuitive unless, like South Africa, Israel is meant to be a 
bastion for White Jews, while discriminating against its non-White population. These acts 
of torture and sterilization, if true, are clear violations of human dignity engaged in not 
only against the Arab population, but the Ethiopian Jewish population as well. 
 The last item under article 2(a) on the right to life and liberty is that of arbitrary 
detention. As discussed above, the 1979 Emergency Powers Laws gives Israel the ability 
to hold suspects of security offenses in administrative detention. The ability to hold a 
person for an indefinite amount of time without trial is a violation of human dignity in 
that is gives one person or group the right to decide the fate of another without hearing 
justifications for such treatment. 
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 Article 2(b) is the category dealing with the imposition “of living conditions 
calculated to cause [the] physical destruction in whole or in part” of a specific racial 
group or groups.305 Israel has been complicit in such actions in a number of different 
ways, one of which is its policies of land expropriation. Law such as the 1945 Resolution 
125, the 1950 Absentees’ Property Law, and the 1953 Land Acquisition Law were used 
to confiscate land from the Palestinians who were living there, claim it as ‘uninhabited’ 
or ‘abandoned’ then lease it out to Jewish immigrants. Similarly the Land Ordinance 
Amendment of 2010 allows Israel to expropriate land for ‘public purposes.’ As 93 
percent of the land in Israel is controlled by the State or by the Jewish National Fund, and 
is exclusively for Jewish use, the land required for ‘public purposes’ must then come 
from the remaining seven percent, of which all Arab land is a part. 
 The expropriation of land is not the only way in which Israel attempts to diminish 
the Arab presence within its population, but is part of a larger ideology of population 
transfer.306 Transfer in this case would mean the relocation of the Palestinians to areas 
outside of Israel, either in a future Palestinian state, or even in surrounding countries such 
as Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.307 Such policies and actions are considered apartheid 
under the Rome Statute.308 The idea of transfer is best explained through the adage ‘a 
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land without a people for a people without a land’309 or rather the idea that Jewish people 
needed an empty space on which they could establish their own state. However, seeing as 
the land of Palestine was not uninhabited, the idea of removing, or ‘transferring,’ the 
population was developed.310 Transfer in Israel is most easily seen today with respect to 
the Bedouin population who live in unrecognized villages in the Negev Desert. While the 
Bedouins themselves are Israeli citizens, they have no “basic services, such as running 
water, electricity, roads, proper education, health and welfare services” because of the 
nature of their communities.311 The buildings in these villages are also likely to be 
demolished because they have been built illegally.312 Additionally, a recent piece of 
Israeli legislation introduced on June 24, 2013, the Prawer-Begin Plan, could have had 
the effect of demolishing 35 unrecognized Bedouin villages, displacing an estimated 
30,000 - 40,000 people.313 This bill was decried by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, in the summer of 2013, who said that it 
sought to “legitimize forcible displacement and dispossession of indigenous Bedouin 
communities in the Negev.”314 These acts certainly demonstrate an imposition of living 
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conditions to destroy part of the population. While this section of the Apartheid 
Convention may be interpreted as imposing famine or other hardships that cause death, 
Israel’s policies rather follow the idea of voluntary transfer, in which is the idea that by 
making conditions unbearable, the populations will leave on their own, which is 
nonviolent form of population destruction.315  
 The third part of article two of the Apartheid Convention covers policies and laws 
that are exclusionary based on race. This includes a number of different of things from 
political, economic, and cultural life, to prevention of nationality, and education among 
other things. As stated above, Israel guarantees many political rights, with all citizens 
having the right to vote. The only area in which there is not complete political equality is 
who can run for office, as there are restrictions in place which seem to affect Palestinians 
more so than Jewish Israelis, such as invalidating the candidacy of anyone who has 
visited and enemy state, which includes Syria and Lebanon, without permission. In 
addition, a recent law raised minimum number of seats required to sit in the Knesset that 
will affect all predominantly Arab political parties. However, this does not prevent 
Palestinians from running for, or holding office, it just limits who among them can and 
how many. Likewise, the major impairment of economic rights is that non-Jews are 
barred from using the 93 percent of the land controlled by the Israel Land Authority, 
limiting where they rent land to run businesses, factories, or other economic enterprises. 
 When it comes to exclusion from culture, Israel is more divisive. One area in 
which Israel differs from South Africa is its plethora of laws that promote the well being 
of, and give preference to the Jewish people. When there are laws that benefit the culture 
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of the dominant ethno-religious group, anyone who does not share that identity is 
excluded from being a part of mainstream society. The laws that promote Jewish 
holidays, holy sites, the values of Judaism and Zionism through the media, and others do 
not provide any validation of acknowledgement of the cultures and beliefs of minorities, 
and do nothing to cater to them. Additionally, because Jewish identity is passed down 
matrilineally, short of conversion to Judaism, most minorities cannot assimilate in to the 
dominant culture, forever excluding them from being full participants in society.316 
Another reason for this is that there is no ‘Israeli’ nationality which is common to all 
citizens, instead there are only nationalities based upon ethno-religious affiliations.317 
This prevents a secular society which is defined by an inclusive, common nationality, and 
lets race and religion play a secondary role.  
 While Israeli education policy is not inclusive for the same reason that it promotes 
the dominant Jewish narrative, it also discriminates by giving preferential treatment to 
those who served the Israeli military. These laws do not prevent Arab students, who are 
usually exempt from the compulsory military service, from attending universities and 
completing tertiary education. They do however make it easier for Jews who have served 
to do so by subsidizing their tuition, housing costs, and other benefits. Such policies do 
not so much as discriminate against one racial group, but rather discriminate in favor of 
another such group.  
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 Subsection D of the Apartheid Convention covers some of the most visible 
aspects of apartheid, specifically the separation of races through the creation of different 
areas, or the prevention of marriages between groups. The policies of the Israel Land 
Authority exemplify the first method of division in that it sets aside 93 percent of the land 
for use solely by Jews. This includes commercial as well as residential purposes. While 
Jews not confined to live in this area, Arabs and other minorities are prevented from 
doing so, which creates an effective separation by defining where the minorities can live 
and own businesses. In addition, the 2011 Cooperative Societies Act amendment made it 
so that small communities could decide which applicants to allow to become members of 
the individual communities. Though the law includes a clause prohibiting rejection of 
candidacy based on religion, race, nationality, or political views, it did allow for rejection 
over concerns of social life, and the town’s socio-cultural fabric, which could be used to 
create Jewish only towns in the remaining seven percent. These policies have created and 
allow for the creation of areas that are accessibly only to Jews, placing restrictions on 
minorities in Israel. 
 Unlike South Africa, Israel has no laws that explicitly prohibit people from 
different racial or ethnic groups from having sex or romantic relationships. However, 
since the oversight of marriage is left to religious leaders, this creates problems for 
‘mixed’ couples. Marriages between Jews and non-Jews are therefore not prohibited by 
law, but are rather prohibited by practice, as no Rabbis will oversee such a marriage 
within Israel. This creates a separation between the Jewish and minority communities as 
it prevents them from mixing, allowing the minorities to assimilate. 
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 The next part of the Apartheid Convention states that “exploitation of the labour 
of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by submitting them to forced 
labour” is considered to be apartheid.318 Since minorities in Israel are free to find jobs in 
whichever sector they like and are able to pursue higher education, the exploitation of 
Palestinian labor is not a major aspect Israeli society. Additionally, if Israel wishes to stay 
a Jewish State, it cannot do so by exploiting large numbers of non-Jews as workers. 
 The last section of article two of the Apartheid Convention deals with those 
organizations and individuals whose fundamental rights and freedoms are denied because 
of their opposition to apartheid. This applies to the case of Israel in two different ways. 
First is the ‘amnesty’ or ‘pardon’ law which gave pardons to people who were charged 
with protesting in 2005 when Israel withdrew from Gaza. This means that people who 
opposed Israel’s policy of leaving Gaza were given pardons, while people, mainly 
Palestinians, who oppose Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem are 
not granted the same leniency. Such policy effectively creates a disparity in punishment 
based on ideology in which those who oppose the occupation are punished more harshly 
than those who wish to see it continue. Likewise, the ‘Nakba’ law allows the government 
to remove state funding from organizations that commemorate the ethnic cleansing of 
Palestine on the same day as Israeli Independence Day. Again, those who see Israel’s 
creation as a sordid series of events that have deprived the indigenous Palestinian 
population of their basic human rights are persecuted while those who follow the 
dominant Israel narrative are not. 
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Apartheid in International Law: The Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
 This study of international law focus on the guidelines set forth in the Apartheid 
Convention as the basis of comparison between Israel and South Africa. The first section 
under article two deals with the right to life which includes killing of one group, violation 
of dignity, and arbitrary punishment. While Israel is not guilty of killing Palestinians as 
an explicit means of  population destruction, there are sporadic instances that have had 
devastating effects. According to one report, between September 2000, the breakout of 
the second Intifada, and April 2013, over 1,500 children have been killed, which is 
roughly one child every three days.319 These killings are not intentional, and they partly 
took place during the second Palestinian Intifada, but it does not discount the fact that 
Israelis kill Palestinians on a regular basis, either by military force or as a result of settler 
violence. While Israel’s violence against Palestinians may not be widespread and 
systematic, it can be described as episodic, with Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 being 
one of the worst. A report by Amnesty International states that in a 23-day period, from 
December, 27 2008 and January 18, 2009 approximately 1,400 Palestinians were killed 
and 5,000 wounded.320 The number of fatalities included 300 children, 115 women, and 
85 men over the age of 50, which accounts for over a third of all deaths.321 These 
numbers indicate that the number of civilian casualties resulting from Israel’s attack is 
very high, which suggests that either Israeli weapons are not completely accurate, or not 
                                                
319 Middle East Monitor, "One Palestinian child has been killed by Israel every 3 days for the past 13 
years." Last modified June 4, 2013. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/6185-one-
palestinian-child-has-been-killed-by-israel-every-3-days-for-the-past-13-years. 
 






all of the targets were defined within international law. While Israel does not currently 
carry out plans to systematically kill off the Palestinian population, killings are 
commonplace and often concentrated in specific attacks such as Operation Cast Lead. 
 Also included in the right to life is bodily or mental harm as well as the freedom 
of dignity. The infliction of bodily harm continues from the previous paragraph, while 
1,500 children have been killed, a further 6,000 have been injured322. Many of the attacks 
are perpetrated by Israeli settlers who damage Palestinian land and property as well as 
people.323 The result is that for Palestinians who live near settlements, the threat of 
violence is high, even without provocation. To make matters worse, there is virtually no 
punishment for those who carry out such attacks, and so they continue unimpeded.324  
 Mental harm is committed in a number of different ways, though it would seem 
that the occupation as a whole is a form of mental injury. The prospect of having a house 
destroyed surely causes mental anguish, but knowing that one cannot get a permit to 
build a house, then having it destroyed, would be devastating. Facets of the occupation 
such as random closures or delays at checkpoints, the route of the Barrier and the land it 
cuts off from villagers, the destruction or seizure of water infrastructure by the Israeli 
military and authorities, the expropriation of land to build settlements, and more would 
seem to be acts that would cause mental harm to those who experience them on a daily 
basis, especially given that they are done arbitrarily, backed by a racist world view. On 
the subject of dignity, when it comes to checkpoints, the assumption is that every 
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Palestinian is a security threat. Which, in addition to being racist, carries a feeling of 
collective punishment.325 The ideology of transfer which influences Israel’s attempts to 
drive the Palestinians from their land is a violation of human dignity as it fails to see 
other people as humans and treat them as such. 
 The last section under the right to life is that of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. 
As the topic of administrative detention has been covered exhaustively before in the 
study, little need be stated here beyond the fact that Israel uses it against Palestinians 
living in the OPT as a means to assert their dominance and control. 
 When it comes to destruction of a population, Israel’s practices in the OPT are 
similar but more aggressive to those practiced within Israel itself. The ideology of 
transfer, which sees the removal of Palestinians from their land to make room for Jewish 
expansion, belies many Israeli policies. As the Historian Benny Morris has observed, the 
concept of “transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism.”326 The expropriation of 
land to build settlements, the route of the Barrier which cuts villages off from fields and 
groves and then prevents access to that land, the destruction of water infrastructure, the 
inability to access natural resources, and others are all policies that take economic 
opportunities away from Palestinians and force them into poverty. In doing so, the idea of 
transfer would suggest that these actions would induce Palestinians to vacate their land, 
as life becomes too unbearable. The ultimate goal is that the Palestinian people will leave 
the West Bank for Jordan or other countries, abandoning the land to the Jewish people, or 
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if not possible, the creation of enclaves in which Palestinians have their own citizenship 
and are not a part of Israel: a situation similar to the Bantustans of South Africa. All of 
these policies are designed to ethnically cleanse the land the Palestinian population by 
inducing them to completely leave or put them in the smallest space possible. 
 Article 2(c) of the Apartheid Convention states that apartheid is  
any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group 
or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of 
the country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full 
development of such a group or groups327  
 
One can look at this passage from a semantic argument and ask from which country are 
the Israelis excluding the Palestinians. If it is Israel, then the argument makes no sense as 
the Palestinians are not Israeli citizens and therefore have no claim to be included. If it is 
Palestine, there is no specific country but rather the territories where the dominant culture 
is the Palestinian culture, and they cannot be said to be excluded from their own culture. 
However, the last part of the statement, ‘preventing the full development of such groups,’ 
is the most useful for this analysis. As has been shown, Israel partakes in many actions 
which seek to impoverish the Palestinian people. The Barrier divides people and land 
while the limits on water usage prevent people from effectively farming and tending to 
groves. The checkpoints inhibit both the movement of workers within the West Bank as 
well as to Israel, but also slow down the movement of goods from production to market. 
The designation of land as Area C along with the near impossibility to obtain a building 
permit prevent the Palestinians from exploiting natural resources in terms of mining and 
mineral extraction from the Dead Sea. In Gaza, Israel tightly controls what goods can be 
                                                
327 Apartheid Convention, article 2(c). 
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imported and exported while denying them access to 70 percent of their maritime rights. 
These policies do not exclude Palestinians from participating in the economic life of their 
land, they prevent them have having any sort of meaningful economy or economic 
growth whatsoever. 
 The division of people along racial lines through the creation of separate spaces 
has been well documented in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. As has been discussed, 
Oslo II has created three different areas in the West Bank with different amounts of 
Palestinian and Israeli control over them. This combined with Israel’s building of illegal 
settlements has led to a situation in which the settlements in Area C are reserved only for 
Israeli citizens, most if not all of whom are Jewish, leaving the rest of the ever-shrinking 
area to the Palestinians. This section also mentions the separation of spaces in the context 
of the creation of reserves or ghettos for one racial group. As examined in comparison 
with the Bantustans of South Africa, the area left to the Palestinians is small and divided 
by strips of Israeli controlled land. The allocation of water, which leaves the Palestinians 
less than 15 percent of the total water supply for the West Bank while in comparison a 
small settlement uses a third of that amount for a tiny fraction of the population, is a 
method by which Israel impoverishes the Palestinian people. In effect, they are pushed in 
to smaller areas, away from their land and all the while forced into poverty. The 
comparison to a ghetto is apt. 
 Not often talked about, the exploitation of Palestinian labor in the OPT is an 
important issue. According to a report by OXFAM in 2012, 9,500 Palestinians work on 
farms in Israeli settlements, though the number may be much higher, often working the 
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land expropriated from them.328 The wages earned are not representative of Israeli law 
which stipulates a $6.00 minimum wage, instead they earn $2.00-$4.80 per hour without 
the benefits guaranteed to Israeli workers.329 This discrepancy may not be huge, but the 
fact that Palestinians are forced to work in settlements for less than minimum wage is a 
form of labor exploitation. 
 Lastly the persecution of people and organizations that oppose apartheid, or in 
this case Israel’s policies, is very large. Between 1960 and 2010 over 100 if not 200 
organizations have been declared ‘Unlawful Associations’ by the Israeli military. These 
groups include Fatah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hezbollah, Hamas, 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Islamic Jihad and many 
others.330 Included in the list are many organizations that are listed as charity 
organizations from different countries. It is possible that many of these groups were 
fronts used to fund terrorist groups in Palestine, but it may also be that they helped people 
and were effective at alleviating the living situation for Palestinians. Those who oppose 
Israeli policy are persecuted in other ways from being held in administrative detention, to 
declaring all forms of protest illegal without a permit. The Israelis know that the 
Palestinian population is going to resist any new policy, plan, or expansion of current 
land holdings and as a result the security apparatus of the occupation is built around 
containing and punishing this resistance. 
                                                














CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION 
Analysis and Conclusion 
The study has examined the application of Israeli law and policy towards non-
Jews, primarily Palestinians, both within the state itself as well as within the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. A comparison has been made with the architect of apartheid, 
South Africa, as well as with its designation in international law, namely the Apartheid 
Convention of 1973 and the Rome Statute of 2002. The purpose of this was to move 
beyond the established binary on the subject, which asks ‘Is Israel an apartheid state,’ and 
instead ask ‘To what extent does Israeli law and policy fit within the definitions of 
apartheid?’ Doing so provides a more nuanced understanding of the situation that is not 
captured in the ‘yes-no’ dichotomy that has, until now, dominated the debate on this 
topic. The following table outlines the principles of international law and then compares 
them with the state practice of South Africa and Israel (both within Israel and the te  
OPT). It will be used as the basis for the following discussion. 
Table 1. Apartheid Comparison 
International Law South Africa Israel OPT 
(a) Right to life (i) 
Murder 
Some Murder, not 
systematic 
Nothing intentional 1 Child every 3 
days; operation 
cast lead (episodic 
violence) 
(a) Right to life (ii) 
bodily harm, 
indignity 















(a) Right to life 







(b) Destruction of 
population/Forcible 
transfer 
Not so much, 
wanted separate 



















Minorities can hold 
any job or career, 
restricted access to 
land; Minorities can 
vote, run for office 
with restrictions; 
Education based on 
Jewish/Zionist 
values 
Not Israeli citizens, 



























law; restriction of 
movement 
(e) exploitation of 
labor 
Used Blacks a 





work in settlements 
for less than Israeli 
minimum wage, no 
benefits 















Israel defines itself by a single and exclusive ethno-religious group, calling itself a 
Jewish State and promoting a set of particular ideals, values, culture, and heritage for the 
benefit of its Jewish population. In Israel, all citizens have the right to vote and, with 
some restrictions, can also run for office. Minorities in Israel are restricted economically 
 
123 
in that they cannot rent or lease land that is held by the Israel Land Authority which 
controls 93 percent of the land in Israel, beyond that, however, Palestinians and others are 
able to hold most jobs from member of the Knesset to doctor or even a university 
professor.  Israeli education promotes a Jewish narrative, but all students have access to 
school and higher education, though those who serve in the IDF are given special 
treatment. In Israel the early Zionist idea of ‘a land without a people for a people without 
a land’ dominates the political culture and the idea of transfer, especially on the  political 
right, continues to push Jewish expropriation of Palestinian owned land within Israel. 
Moreover, Israel has created special privileges for the Jewish population over everyone 
else. Examples are the Right of Return and Citizenship laws which guarantee any Jew in 
the world the right to settle in Israel and be granted citizenship status upon entering the 
country. There are many benefits for those who serve in the military and are applied 
equally, however since most Palestinians are exempt from the compulsory military 
service these policies and their benefits apply disproportionately to the Jewish population.  
Applying the Apartheid Convention’s definition and the South Africa case study 
shows that to a certain extent, some of Israeli’s policies does fit the claim of apartheid. 
Article 2 subsection “a” states that included in the definition of apartheid is the “denial to 
a member or members of a racial group or groups and liberty of person: (i) by murder of 
members of racial groups.”331 In both South African and Israel this was, and is, not a 
huge issue because though some have surely died due to repressive measures, there was 
no outright intention to kill Blacks or Israeli minorities. In the OPT the situation is 
different. There is much more violence, with the Palestinians receiving most of it. 
                                                
331 Apartheid Convention, article 2(a)(i). 
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According to one study, a Palestinian child has been killed on average of every three days 
over a decade long period.332 That combined with operation Cast Lead, which killed 
1,400 Palestinians including 300 children in the course of 23 days, can amount to nothing 
less than intentional killing. 
Article 2(a)(ii) covers “serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their 
freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”333 The court system in South Africa was biased against Blacks, 
most of whom were sentenced, and were not able to speak about their time in prison for 
fear further arrest as a result of the Correctional Services Act. In Israel, laws have been 
enacted that strip protections, such as the requirement to make audio and video 
recordings of interrogations, away from suspects of security offenses, most of whom are 
Palestinian. This lack of oversight allows room for torture to be used. Additionally, recent 
claims of temporary sterilization through mandatory birth control injections of Ethiopian 
immigrant women, most of whom are Jewish, is a violation of human dignity. The 
potential for torture also applies within the OPT. Further, while settler violence does 
occur against Palestinians, the case could be made that the entire system of occupation, 
under which Palestinians live, causes mental harm. The inability to move freely, the ever-
encroaching settlements, and the inaccessibility to farmland, all are certain to have effects 
on people’s mental state, especially when the conditions are imposed for no reason other 
than birth.  
                                                
332 Middle East Monitor June 2013.  
 
333 Apartheid Convention, article 2(a)(ii). 
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The last issue of right to life is ‘arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment.’ The 
best description of this policy is that of administrative detention, which has been applied 
in all three cases: in South Africa under the Terrorism Act of 1967; in Israel by the 1979 
Emergency Powers Law; and in the OPT by Administrative Detention article 273. 
The next aspect of apartheid, Article 2(b), includes the “deliberate imposition on a 
racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause its or their physical 
destruction in whole or in part.”334 There are two ways to interpret this clause: either as 
the literal destruction of those in question, which would be considered genocide; or a 
more figurative approach in which people are not killed on a mass scale, but are instead 
removed, along with their culture and lifestyle, from the land in ethnic cleansing. In all 
three cases, the literal understanding as genocide does not fit; there was and is no 
systematic mass killing of Black or Palestinians. However, the ethnic cleansing aspect 
does fit. In South Africa, Blacks were given only a small amount of land, 13 percent, in 
which they could live. Their presence in the remainder of the land was destroyed except 
as workers. Similarly, Israel’s policies toward its Arab population, particularly the 
Bedouins who live in the Negev Desert, is one in which villages were unrecognized, 
preventing them from accessing basic necessities and utilities. Additionally, Israel seeks 
to remove them from their land as part of policy of voluntary transfer, or making 
conditions so harsh that people leave of their own accord. This policy also applies in the 
OPT where the continuing expansion of illegal Israeli settlements has confined 80 percent 
                                                
334 Apartheid Convention, article 2(b). 
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of the people in the West Bank to 40 percent of the land, while receiving less than 15 
percent of the available water335.  
According to the Apartheid Convention, the third facet of apartheid is the 
exclusion of a racial group or groups from the political, economic, social and cultural life 
of the country. In South Africa the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 
effectively disenfranchised the Black population by giving them 3 seats in parliament, but 
these representatives had to be White. Economic rights for non-Whites were restricted as 
to where they could work and in what position. Later, their right to strike was also taken 
away. As per the social and cultural aspects of society, the creation of group areas 
separated the Whites, Coloreds, and Blacks into their own communities preventing much 
intermingling from happening. Another exclusionary aspect was the Bantu Education Act 
of 1953 which allowed the South African government to control what was taught to the 
Black population.  
In Israel some things are different. First, all citizens have the right to vote for 
government positions and while there are restrictions that seem to disproportionately 
target minorities as far as candidacy is concerned, such as rejection for ‘denying Israel as 
a Jewish and Democratic State’ or visiting an enemy Arab or Muslim country which 
includes Syria and Lebanon without governmental approval, they are thus not fully 
excluded from the process and there are Arabs currently serving in the Knesset. 
Additionally, a recent law that raises the minimum number of votes to sit the in Knesset 
disproportionately affects Arab political parties. Economic rights are mostly equal there 
                                                
335 Oxfam 5. 
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are no restrictions on which fields minorities can work in, however where access to land 
is concerned, as only 7 percent is available for use by non-Jews. 
Culture is another matter entirely. Since the dominant culture is defined as Jewish, 
which is defined both in religious and ethnic terms, with preference for the latter, 
Palestinians are ethnically excluded from being a part of this culture and, unless they 
convert to Judaism, there is no way for them to become a part of it. With the decision of 
the Supreme Court to deny the right to choose Israeli as a nationality, it seems that this 
paradigm will not change soon. Israeli education policy is based on Jewish values and 
loyalty to the Jewish state and people.  
With regard to the OPT, since the dominant culture in question is that of the 
Palestinians and that the Israelis in this case are an outside, occupying force, the 
Palestinians are not being excluded from the dominant cultural, or political, or economic 
aspects of society. The Palestinians have some political rights in that they can vote in 
elections for the Palestinian Authority, but this has no effect on the presence of  the 
Israeli military in the West Bank. On the subject of economics, Palestinians should not be 
seen as being excluded from the Israeli economic system on the account that they are not 
Israeli citizens though both economies are interconnected. Instead, Israel’s control over 
water, expropriation of land for settlements, construction of the Barrier which cuts famers 
off from their fields and groves, the inability to exploit natural mineral deposits, and the 
difficulty in securing building permits, prevents the Palestinians from having any sort of 
meaningful economy in the first place. 
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Next in the Apartheid Convention is the separation of spaces, prohibition of 
mixed marriages, expropriation of land. The separation of spaces is  one the most well-
known aspects of South African apartheid, and it took many forms from the separation of 
urban areas into racially defined zones to the creation of native homelands called 
Bantustans. The control of movement accompanied the segregation of the population. 
Blacks were required to carry passbooks and report to the officers in charge upon 
entering a new area. Sexual relations were prohibited between White and non-White 
members of society until mixed marriages were outright banned, then all forms of 
interracial romance was illicit. While most of the land distribution was settled by the 
Native Land and Trust Act of 1936, the 1954 Natives Resettlement Act did allow for 
expropriation of native land. 
The division of space along ethno-religious lines does exist in Israel, though not 
as pronounced as South Africa, and is exemplified by the fact that the 93 percent of the 
land that is under the jurisdiction of the Israel Land Authority is allocated solely for 
Jewish use. Also, the ability of small communities to deny membership based on vague 
principles such as socio-cultural fabric, or concerns about the social life allow for denial 
of membership based on difference of race/religion/ethnicity, even though this is legally 
prohibited, allows for the creation of Jewish only communities. The expropriation of land 
is allowed so long as it is expropriated for ‘public purposes,’ even if it is never used to 
the stated purposes. This has mostly been used to confiscate the land of Palestinian 
citizens of Israel. 
 
129 
In the Occupied Palestinian Territories the separation of spaces is different that 
the situation in Israel. The land is separated not only along ethno-religious lines, Jews in 
the settlements and Palestinians in their villages, but also along national lines where the 
settlers are Israeli and the Arabs are stateless. In fact, most of the land is under Israeli 
control(area C), leaving the land under Palestinian control resembling an archipelago. 
Beyond the separation of spaces, there is also a separation of government. The Israeli 
settlers live under Israeli civil law, while the Palestinians live under Palestinian civil law 
and Israeli military law. Even then, the Palestinian Authority must coordinate with the 
Israeli government and is not allowed to have its own diplomatic relations with other 
countries. The movement between these islands of Palestinian land are controlled by the 
Israeli military which frequently sets up checkpoints to control the movement of the local 
population, between villages as well as to Israel. If Palestinians wish to travel outside 
their own village they must carry their ID card as well has have a permit to do so. 
Conversely the Israeli settlers have their own road system which connects the settlements 
to Israel and cannot be used by Palestinians. When it comes to the expropriation of land, 
Israel’s settlement enterprise is constantly expanding and confiscating land from the 
surrounding Palestinian villages. 
The exploitation of labor is also included in the definition of apartheid. With the 
dominant racial group in South Africa in the minority, it was only natural that the Black 
population would be needed to help the country function economically. In conjunction 
with the control over education, the White government was able to dictate where Blacks 
could work and under what conditions. Two things prevent the section from applying to 
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Israel. First is that all citizens have equal economic opportunities in terms of which fields 
they can pursue careers, be it medicine, education, or even government. Second, the idea 
of transferring the Palestinian population off of their land and into either the occupied 
territories or neighboring countries, indicates that Israel would rather not have an Arab 
minority and thus does not need or want it for labor purposes. In the OPT some 
Palestinians are working in the settlements, often on land stolen from them, as there are 
no other job opportunities available. These workers are on average paid less than the 
Israeli minimum wage and do not receive the benefits afforded to Israeli workers. 
The final category is persecution of those who oppose apartheid. South Africa 
pursued a number of policies to this end. Organizations were deemed unlawful which not 
only meant their disbandment, but also made it illegal for other groups to carry on the 
same work. The Pan Africanist Congress and the African National Congress were such 
organizations that were banned by name in the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960. 
Israel engages in similar activities. The ‘Nakba Law’ states that groups who 
commemorate Israel’s Independence Day as a day of sorrow, in remembrance of Israel’s 
ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in 1948, can have their state funding reduced. In 
contrast, the ‘Pardon Law’ gave amnesty to people who in 2005 demonstrated against 
Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. Those who protest against Israeli policy because they 
prefer greater control over the Palestinians are given pardons, while those who protest 
Israel’s occupation are not, creating an ideological and legal divide of which political 
views are and are not acceptable. When it comes to persecution of those who resist 
Israel’s activities in the West Bank, most everything that Israel does beyond the control 
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of daily life via checkpoints and Israeli only roads, fits this description. The Israeli 
military has the ability to restrict all forms of protest, impose curfews, force services to 
open or close and many other powers that can be used to punish resistors. 
 Israeli policy and law fit many of the categories listed above, specifically the 
violation of human dignity, exclusion from cultural life, separation of spaces, and the 
persecution of opposition groups. When it comes to the destruction of the population, and 
exclusion of political rights Israel fits partially, and the exclusion for economic rights and 
the exploitation of labor are not applicable. Thus, the claim of apartheid with respect to 
Israel does not  fit the South African model, however, in certain respects there are clear 
parallels. Getting away from the established yes/no binary it is clear that Israel falls 
somewhere in between, and, given the way it matches up with the Apartheid Convention, 
the state is closer to the apartheid end of the spectrum than to a liberal democracy. 
 The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is very different from that of 
Israel. In the OPT the Palestinians live in territorially small island-like communities 
governed by their own slightly autonomous government, the Palestinian Authority, and 
hence are not Israeli citizens. Additionally, for matters of security, Israeli military code 
takes precedence of Palestinian civil law. Those living in the settlements are Israeli 
citizens and are governed by Israeli civil law. Movement for Palestinians is restricted 
through a series of the checkpoints and they are required to carry their ID card with them 
at all time. It is evident that the situation in the OPT is a mirror of the Bantustans 
envisioned in South Africa with some of Israel’s policies, namely the bypass roads and 
the construction of the Barrier going beyond their historical predecessor.  
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 The analysis clearly shows that while the use of apartheid with respect to Israel is 
not a perfect match, there are many ways in which it is closer to an apartheid state than a 
liberal democracy. On the other hand, the situation in the OPT is one of apartheid, 
especially with respect to Bantustans. These outcomes should not be surprising as they 
were foreseen by Ben-Gurion nearly 40 years ago, and recently they have been  
forewarned by Secretary of State John Kerry.336  
 
Critiques 
 A concern that is often brought up about the use of the Apartheid Convention as a 
means of measuring Israeli policy is the phrase from article two which states that “the 
following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and 
systematically oppressing them.”337 The inclusion of this phrase adds another dimension 
to the apartheid discourse: that of intent. It can be argued that no matter how Israel 
compares with the Apartheid Convention, if one can show that Israel’s intent is not 
continued oppression but that that situation is temporary, then the claim of apartheid falls 
apart.  
 It does not take much however to show that this is not a temporary measure. If 
Israel truly wishes to be a ‘State of the Jewish people,’ and not a state where all of its 
citizens are treated equally, then anyone who does not identify as Jewish is necessarily 
excluded from the dominant culture and as a result their rights are reduced as they are not 
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part of the preferred social group. The existence of the Israel Land Authority and its 
control of 93 percent of the land specifically for Jewish use, as well as the continued 
expropriation of land and transfer ideology clearly show that at present Israel has no 
intention of making all its citizens equal. However, even though Israel’s control and 
domination are intentional, the political and economic rights of minorities complicate the 
comparison enough to make the definition of apartheid under international law a partial 
comparison.  Sammy Smooha’s argument that Israel is an ethnic democracy confirms the 
finding that Israel has apartheid-like policies and that they are intentional. He claims that 
an ethnic democracy “is a system that combines the extension of civil and political rights 
to individuals and some collective rights to minorities, with institutionalization of 
majority control over the state.”338 He further explains this by saying  
The state practices a policy of creating a homogenous nation-state, a state of and 
for a particular ethnic nation, and acts to promote the language, culture, numerical 
majority, economic well-being, and political interests of this group. Although 
enjoying citizenship and voting rights, the minorities are treated as second-class 
citizens, feared as a threat, excluded from the national power structure, and placed 
under some control. At the same time, the minorities are allowed to conduct a 
democratic and peaceful struggle that yields incremental improvement in their 
status.339  
 
Smooha’s conception of an ethnic ‘democracy,’ which is modeled after Israel, clearly 
violates the Apartheid Convention, and would do so no matter where it would be 
implemented. 
 The concern about intent also applies to the OPT, and maybe even more so 
considering the land is occupied and not officially part of Israel. In writing on the 
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outcome of the 1967 War, Avi Shlaim notes that the territories were likened to a dowry 
and the Palestinians the bride, and though the government was not entirely sure what to 
do with the land, they wanted to keep the former without the latter.340 Many Zionists, 
however, saw the territories as new land on which to build settlements, with the first 
being built less than two months after the end of the war.341 Gershom Gorenberg notes 
that “by the time [Menachem] Begin came to power [1980] … the internal Israeli 
argument was over where to settle, not whether to.”342 With this mindset, the expansion 
of the settlements is intentional control over the land. When it comes to the subject of the 
Oslo Accords, it could be argued that the creation of the Palestinian Authority is evidence 
that Israel’s control is only temporary. However, Edward Said notes that “Oslo’s malign 
genius [was] that even Israel’s ‘concessions’ were so heavily encumbered with conditions 
and qualifications and entailments … that they could not be enjoyed by the Palestinians 
in any way resembling self-determination.”343 The famous, or now potentially infamous, 
peace talks can also be seen as further entrenching Israel’s domination of the OPT, thus 
further giving credence to the connection between Israel and  apartheid.. 
 Another counter argument to the claim of apartheid in the OPT has been put forth 
by Zilbershats who stated in the literature review that it is not as if Israel wishes to 
maintain a system of domination and control in the OPT, but rather it is out of security 
concerns that this is a temporary necessity. However, two facts complicate this argument. 
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First, if Israeli policy is truly concerned with security, then the Barrier should have been 
built along the ‘Green’ Line, not within the West Bank. One could argue that this 
diversion was necessary to protect the settlements. This then invokes the second point of 
contention. If one accepts the assumption that the Palestinians pose so great a security 
threat as to require military occupation and the erection of the Barrier, then it is 
completely illogical to move any segment of the Israeli Jewish civilian population closer 
to the supposed enemy. There is no situation in which moving families closer to those 
who wish to do harm makes any sort of sense from a security perspective. If Israel is 
really concerned about its security, the settlements would never have been built in their 
current location, if at all. 
 One last counterargument that is likely to arise is that a missed characteristic of 
South Africa was the rule of the White minority over the Black majority, while in Israel, 
Arabs are a minority and those in the OPT are not even citizens. First, the Israeli military 
rule in the OPT is one of minority rule as the settler population is outnumbered roughly 
5:1, and any regime that preferences their views over that of the majority is clearly 
minority rule. Second, it is not morally significant whether Israel has a majority rule or 
minority rule over a given territory. This was never a stipulation in either the South 
African case or anywhere else under international law. Any regime that preferences one 
ethnic/religious/racial group over another is by definition engaging in discrimination and 
should be criticized for such practices. Israeli apartheid is not a function of minority rule, 




Limitations of Research 
There are two major limitations to the research presented here. First is the access 
to sources of law. This was less of an issue with the South African case study as most of 
the laws used up until 1951 were available through LLMC Digital and the rest were made 
available through interlibrary loan either electronically or through actual codices of South 
African law. The Israeli case however, was much more difficult. Except for the few laws 
which are translated into English and posted either on the Knesset website or the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, access to actual texts was difficult. A few of the 
laws were accessed through the library and interlibrary loan, and some from Adalah, the 
legal enter for Arab minority rights in Israel. Those for which English versions could not 
be found, the summaries provided in the Adalah discriminatory law database were used 
instead. This was decided to be a trustworthy source because though not all laws are 
provided in English translation, they are all available in Hebrew. Given more time, the 
author would have liked to try to track down the necessary laws from Israeli government 
websites in Arabic and provide translations of the necessary passages.  
The second major limitation was the sources available to supplement the legal 
framework. Sources from respected international bodies (such as the UN, Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch) were used wherever possible, though other 
sources such as B’tselem were used when necessary. B’tselem in particular was used as it 
is an Israeli  organization that works in the OPT and can easily gather first hand 





There are a couple areas for future research. The first is the continuation and 
completion of the work done here, especially with respect to the lack of access to actual 
texts for many Israeli laws. This would likely be done through the use of Arabic texts and 
translating them into English to strengthen the arguments contained within this paper. 
The second area for future research is furthering the comparison with South 
Africa by looking at political narratives, ideology, and mythology. One such source is 
Leonard Thompson’s book The Political Mythology of Apartheid. While the fact based 
approach between South African and Israeli policies allows for an easily comparison with 
international law, there is more to understanding apartheid than practice, namely the 
ideologies which shaped the creation of apartheid. This has been briefly discussed in the 
discussion of intent and noting differences, such as the Bantu Investment Corporation, 
however there is much more to explore in the realm of political mythology that could be 
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